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THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY: CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION AFTER JEVIC
Jonathan C. Lipson*
Abstract: Academics have long debated whether the order of bankruptcy distributions
should be “absolute” or “relative.” Should courts have the flexibility to scramble priority to
serve some greater good? The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding
Corp. holds that the answer is “no”: priority is absolute absent the consent of affected
creditors.
“Consent” is not self-defining, however, and is largely ignored in debates about priority.
This is a problem because consent is hard to pinpoint in corporate reorganizations, a type of
aggregate proceeding that can involve hundreds or thousands of creditors and shareholders.
Although the Jevic majority does not define consent, its reasoning reflects a Court concerned
about process values that proxy for it: stakeholder participation, outcome predictability, and
procedural integrity. Jevic thus reveals a secret: “priority” is not only about the order in
which a corporate debtor pays its creditors, but also about the process by which it does so.
I make three main points. First, I explain why “consent” is indeterminate in this context,
inviting inspection of process quality. Second, I assess Jevic’s process-value framework.
Implementing these values is not costless, so the Court’s commitment to them suggests that
efficiency—the mantra of many scholars—is not the only or necessarily the most important
value in reorganization. Third, I argue that these values conflict with the power that senior
secured creditors have gained in recent years to control corporate reorganizations. Many
worry that this power produces needless expropriation and error. I conclude by sketching
opportunities that Jevic creates for scholars and practitioners who share these concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding
Corp.1 is viewed as its most important opinion on corporate
reorganization in at least a generation2—but often for the wrong reason.
Many view the opinion as being about “priority,” the order in which a
corporate debtor’s assets are distributed when it completes the
bankruptcy process.3 Facially, this is correct: Justice Breyer, writing for
a 6-2 majority, held that final distributions in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
must follow the “ordinary” and “basic” priority rules of the Bankruptcy
Code absent “the affected creditors’ consent.”4
At a deeper level, however, Jevic is about process, and the values that
should inform corporate reorganization practice. Here, the priority rules
were in doubt only because the lower courts had approved a so-called

1. 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 979 (2017).
2. See Ralph Brubaker, Taking Bankruptcy’s Distribution Rules Seriously: How the Supreme
Court Saved Bankruptcy from Self-Destruction, BANKR. L. LETTER, Apr. 2017, at 1 (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. has the potential to be one of
the most consequential events for bankruptcy reorganization law and practice since the famous 1913
absolute-priority decision in Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd.” (footnote omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Hollace T. Cohen, Is the Absolute Priority Rule Alive and Well? Jevic Threatens the
Rule and Other Core Bankruptcy Principles, 26 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 45, 46 (2017)
(writing prior to Supreme Court ruling that “[i]f Jevic is reversed, it will likely bar any deviation
from the absolute priority rule in the context of a pre-plan settlement and may provide guidance
with respect to deviation from other core bankruptcy principles in pre-plan settlements, whether the
debtor is solvent or insolvent. If, however, Jevic is affirmed, it will allow a deviation from the
absolute priority rule if the debtor is insolvent, without being faced with the question whether a
deviation from that rule or any other core principle is permissible if the debtor is solvent”); Nicholas
L. Georgakopoulos, Through Jevic’s Mirror: Orders, Fees, and Settlements, 72 BUS. LAW. 917,
935–36 (2017) (arguing that “the most pronounced consequence of Jevic” will be its effect on the
priority of payments pursuant to so-called “first-day” orders in Chapter 11 cases); Bruce Grohsgal,
How Absolute Is the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 439, 454 (2017) (criticizing Jevic and arguing that “a bankruptcy court
has authority under the Code to approve a settlement and structured dismissal in a Chapter 11 case
when it is in the best interest of creditors, even if distributions among unsecured creditors are not in
accordance with the absolute priority rule”); Anna Haugen et al., Re-“Structuring” Dismissal
Flexibility: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Jevic Decision, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2017, at
12, 72 (“Practitioners should also expect additional scrutiny of any priority-violating [transactions]
as lower courts grapple with the bounds of Jevic, especially in the face of creditor dissent.”).
4. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 983; see also id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with
the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from
the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final
distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”). Although they recognized that the Jevic
Court “answer[ed] a novel and important question of bankruptcy law,” Justices Alito and Thomas
nevertheless dissented because “having persuaded us to grant certiorari on one question, petitioners
chose to argue a different question on the merits.” Id. at 987 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They would
therefore have dismissed the petition on grounds that certiorari was improvidently granted. Id.
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“structured dismissal,” a procedural concoction under which senior and
junior claimants sought to split the assets of the debtor, a trucking
company, by skipping the “mid-priority” wage claims held by the
petitioners, the debtor’s terminated drivers.5 As used in Jevic, this
procedural maneuver threatened the foundations of the corporate
reorganization system, not only its priority structure, but also its process
framework.6
Structured dismissals have become an important vehicle for resolving
Chapter 11 cases.7 They substitute for the two main exit paths Congress
created out of corporate bankruptcy, a “plan of reorganization” under
Chapter 11—a cross between a consent decree and a contract8—or a
trustee-supervised liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.9
Structured dismissals are attractive because they are cheaper than
Chapter 11 plans, which require costly disclosure and creditor voting.10
And, they are considered less risky than a Chapter 7 liquidation, where a
trustee may impair recoveries by selling assets piece-meal and/or sue
those who harmed the corporate debtor.11 In many cases, including Jevic,

5. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 188 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. 973. See generally Order
Granting Joint Motion of the Debtors, CIT, Sun Capital & the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 349 & 1112(b) & Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Entry of an
Order: (I) Approving Settlement Agreement & Releasing Claims; (II) Dismissing the Debtors’
Cases Upon Implementation of Settlement; & (III) Granting Related Relief, In re Jevic Holding
Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Dismissal Order], vacated,
Order at 1, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 13-104-SLR (D. Del. May 16, 2017).
As explained further below, a portion of the drivers’ claims would be viewed as “mid-priority”
because they were neither senior secured claims nor junior unsecured claims. Instead, they were
entitled to a statutorily created fourth priority over general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(4) (2012).
6. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (observing that the “consequences [of upholding the dismissal] are
potentially serious”).
7. Id. at 979 (“Although the Code does not expressly mention structured dismissals, they ‘appear
to be increasingly common.’” (quoting AM. BANKR. INST, COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF
CHAPTER 11: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 270 n.973 (2014) [hereinafter ABI
REPORT])).
8. See Official Creditors Comm. of Stratford of Tex., Inc. v. Stratford of Tex., Inc. (In re
Stratford of Tex., Inc.), 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing that reorganization plan
“represents a kind of consent decree which has many attributes of a contract”).
9. They are also an alternative to a “clean” or “unstructured” dismissal, where the case is simply
dismissed without the special provisions found in structured dismissals including, as here, a
deviation from absolute priority. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 1112; discussion infra Part I (regarding
dismissal standards and effects).
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125–1126, 1129.
11. Id. § 726; see, e.g., In re Hyatt, 509 B.R. 707, 722 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2014) (observing that
Chapter 7 recoveries tend to be lower than those in Chapter 11).
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the targets of those suits may be the very people who want the structured
dismissal—those who controlled the debtor before liquidation.
Jevic taps into a long-running debate among bankruptcy scholars:
should priority be “absolute,” meaning that senior creditor A must be
paid before junior creditor B, who must be paid before shareholder C,
and so on?12 Or, may we scramble the order, permitting “relative”
priority in the service of some greater good?13 The lower courts in Jevic
took the latter view, believing that the greater good was closure—
resolving a case that appeared hopeless because the debtor had no assets
to fund a plan or trustee-supervised liquidation.14
The Jevic Court disagreed. In reversing, the majority established that
priority is “absolute” absent consent. That is, consent trumps closure.
But this also means that Jevic transforms the priority debate. Now, we
12. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (1991) (the “absolute priority rule has been the
cornerstone of reorganization practice and theory”); Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking
Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1236
(2013) (the absolute priority rule is “quite appropriately, bankruptcy’s most important and famous
rule”); cf. Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 214
(2012) (“Anticipation of breaches in absolute priority can raise a firm’s ex ante cost of capital.”). A
notable earlier contribution is Walter J. Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate
Reorganizations: A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 437–39 (1958) (rejecting several “relative
priority” proposals, including maintaining the old capital structure, having an “expansible
valuation,” and allowing the court to set a “maximum permissible capitalization”).
13. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the
Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 792 (2017) (providing examples of relative priority);
Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 759, 765 n.2 (2011) (“The focus of Option-Preservation Priority is the relationship
between classes of creditors and the decisions that affect the maximization of assets in Chapter
11.”); Grohsgal, supra note 3, at 451 (“The absolute priority rule under the current Code is a special,
limited rule. It is not a rule that operates substantively throughout the Code.”); Richard Squire, The
Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 853–55 (2014) (arguing that
“asymmetry” in priority produces opportunistic behavior). Earlier versions appear in James C.
Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a
Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 130 (1928) (using “relative priority” as
shorthand for “priority of income position”). Narrower definitions of relative priority might not
view the distributions approved by the lower courts in Jevic as “relative priority.” See, e.g., Walter
J. Blum, The “New Directions” for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1367, 1368–69 (1954). But the underlying distributive mechanism and logic are the same: outof-the-money juniors were to be paid over seniors’ objections based on a view that this was a
wealth-enhancing outcome.
14. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 982 (2017) (“The
[bankruptcy] court accordingly decided to grant the motion in light of the ‘dire circumstances’
facing the estate and its creditors. Specifically, the court predicted that without the settlement and
dismissal, there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the
secured creditors. A confirmable Chapter 11 plan was unattainable. And there would be no funds to
operate, investigate, or litigate were the case converted to a proceeding in Chapter 7.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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know what the rule is—absolute priority in final distributions—but we
must determine what comprises its exception, “consent.” Ordinarily,
“consent” for these purposes is shown by an affirmative creditor vote on
a plan of reorganization. But, the structured dismissal—which, itself,
survives Jevic—replaces the reorganization plan and its procedural
protections, including creditor voting. The threat to those procedural
protections was as great a problem as—perhaps greater than—the threat
to the absolute priority rule (APR) sanctioned by the lower courts.
Discussions of priority rarely consider the role of consent in
bankruptcy.15 Instead, they focus on the economic merits of the rulechoices: does absolute or relative priority produce the greatest social
welfare?16 The omission is embarrassing, but not surprising. Absent
creditors’ vote on a plan, “consent” is difficult to pinpoint in corporate
reorganization because it is a form of aggregate proceeding in which
hundreds or thousands of creditors and shareholders assert different
rights against a common debtor.17 Is “consent” merely the failure to
object to some important action in the case, such as a structured
dismissal? Or does it require something more, such as affirmative
assent? The majority in Jevic did not say, but the risk of false negatives
is high because it is not clear whether a failure to object would signal
consent—or simply a misunderstanding of what was at stake.
In theory, unsecured creditors may be represented by a committee
and, as in Jevic, that committee may purport to consent on behalf of
creditors. But because the same committee in Jevic technically
represented both the settling unsecured creditors and the objecting
drivers, the most we can say is that representative consent presents in
bankruptcy the same ethical challenges we find in aggregate litigations,

15. Cf. Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 663, 686–87 (2009) (discussing “consent” generally). Literature on “consent” in
aggregate litigation is discussed infra Part II.
16. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the
Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1396 (arguing that absolute
priority promotes increased distribution values). Although not framed in terms of consent, Jay
Westbrook was among the first to recognize the procedural powers that senior creditors can assert.
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 797
(2004) (“[C]ontrol of the bankruptcy process, rather than formal rules of security and priority, is the
key to understanding both secured-credit and bankruptcy law: Control is the function of bankruptcy;
priority is the end for which it is employed.”).
17. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 991 (2012) (discussing “[t]he hotly contested issue of claimant consent in
the resolution of aggregate litigation”).
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generally: one agent cannot act effectively for adverse principals.18
Worse, the statutory standards by which a court should assess structured
dismissals are opaque, cobbled together from provisions that say nothing
about them.19 How can a court identify consent when no one knows what
the rules are?
Jevic hints at some answers. Courts concerned about consent—in
structured dismissals, and perhaps beyond—should assess the quality of
the process that leads to important judicial action, such as case
resolution. While Jevic does not define “consent,” the majority opinion
reveals a Court concerned about three process values that may proxy for
it:
Participation. Consent requires participation. The Chapter 11 plan
is corporate reorganization’s main participatory mechanism, in
particular through disclosure and voting.20 Because structured
dismissals require neither, courts will have to decide what forms of
“off-plan” participation permit an inference of consent.
Predictability. Consent is more plausible—both to reach and to
show—if the rules around which parties settle are more predictable.
By choosing absolute, rather than relative, priority, Jevic narrows
the range of possible outcomes and the standards by which they
must be assessed.21 Absolute priority increases predictability.
Procedural integrity. Embedded in concerns about participation and
predictability is anxiety about procedural integrity, in particular
threats of collusion and opportunistic litigation.22 These forms of
misbehavior threaten the credibility of consent, and confidence in
18. The focus in aggregate litigation has often been on conflicts held by lawyers. See, e.g.,
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265,
317 (2011) (criticizing quasi-class action settlements because they empower lawyers and “the
empowerment of the lawyer is not purely in service of a better deal for clients. In this setting, the
lawyer acquires more money than any of her clients”). Legal ethics in aggregate litigation are
discussed infra Part II. In theory, separate committees may be appointed to represent priority
creditors, such as Jevic’s drivers, although the added cost makes that problematic.
19. As discussed infra Part I, structured dismissals are apparently vetted by courts under, among
others, Bankruptcy Code §§ 349, 363, 1112 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019, none
of which offer judges any guidance greater than “cause.”
20. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (“[P]rohibiting an
attempt to ‘short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by
establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.’” (quoting Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700
F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983))).
21. Id. at 986 (discussing unpredictability introduced by lower courts’ rationales).
22. Id. at 986–87 (warning of “risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured creditors and general
unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority unsecured creditors” (citing Bank of Am.
Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999))).
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corporate reorganization, generally. Jevic is a reminder that
bankruptcy judges must police the integrity of the reorganization
process, even as they seek to maximize its payouts.
Like many process values, these are often lauded in principle and
disputed in practice. Implementing them may be especially problematic
in the “unruly”23 world of corporate reorganization. They require time
and money, which are usually scarce in this context. While earlier
writers sometimes argued that bankruptcy should be treated as if it were
a species of civil procedure,24 they never explained what this meant,
offered any theory of the process values that should underlie their
proposal, or appreciated the procedural power that priority gives senior
creditors which is, as explained below, the bane of corporate
reorganization practice for many today.
The relationship between priority and process is severely
undertheorized. Yet, that relationship threads the fabric of corporate
reorganization. Many observers, for example, believe that senior
creditors assert too much power over the reorganization process without
considering the procedural leverage conferred by their seniority.25 In the
Chrysler26 and General Motors27 bankruptcies, for example, senior
creditors used their priority status to obtain veto rights at the beginning
of these cases that squelched participation, exposed other stakeholders to
senior creditors’ whims, and created the appearance of collusion.28 A
study of early maneuvers in Jevic shows a similar pattern: senior
creditors gained control of the reorganization process at the outset,
rendering the problematic structured dismissal there virtually inevitable.
23. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012) (noting
the importance of clarity and predictability in light of the fact that the “Bankruptcy Code
standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”).
24. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 934 (2004); see also Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s
Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576–77 (1998) (observing that in the 1990s there were
“two distinct camps. In the first are traditional bankruptcy lawyers and scholars . . . . The [second]
group’s distinctive characteristic is its focus on procedure”).
25. For ease of reference, I refer to senior secured creditors—whether acting as individual lenders
or in groups—as “senior creditors.” I refer to stakeholders whose claims are not secured by
collateral in some way—including priority unsecured creditors, such as the drivers in Jevic—as
“junior creditors/stakeholders.” In rare cases where I discuss junior lienholders, I simply call them
that.
26. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (mem.).
27. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
28. See, e.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 16, at 1378. See generally Mark J. Roe & David
Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010); discussion infra section
III.B.
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Senior creditors are often the motivating force behind structured
dismissals because they enable them to capture the benefits of
bankruptcy’s preemptive power without the costs of a plan or the
scrutiny of a trustee-supervised liquidation.29 Many worry that senior
creditor control is the greatest threat facing the Chapter 11 system
because it vests dominance in a single, largely unaccountable
stakeholder.30 Concentrated, unaccountable power leads to expropriation
and error. It conflicts with Jevic’s process values because it debilitates
participation by other stakeholders, reduces predictability, and
undermines procedural integrity. It also upsets the balance Congress
sought to strike between senior and junior claimants in the Bankruptcy
Code that was intended to promote the process values articulated in
Jevic.31
Although the subject matter is technical, this paper’s claim is
straightforward: Jevic reveals that the secret life of priority is not only
about distributive rights, but also about process values of participation,
predictability, and procedural integrity. Senior creditor power to control
the reorganization process can threaten these values, so participants and
observers after Jevic should rethink the (im)balance of power in Chapter
11.
The paper makes three main contributions. After summarizing Jevic,
Part II explains problems with “consent” as a decisional standard for
resolving corporate reorganizations absent a Chapter 11 plan. Part III
assesses Jevic’s process-oriented framework as a proxy for consent. Part
IV shows how senior creditors can use their priority rights to
29. Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and
Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2010, at 1, 58–59 (2010)
(discussing use of structured dismissals where a corporate debtor has “no unsecured assets to
administer or with insufficient unsecured assets to fund a confirmable chapter 11 plan”).
30. See, e.g., Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Limited
Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 765, 768 (“The reality then is that
the entire reorganization is dependent on the good graces of the prebankruptcy controlling secured
lender. That means that important stakeholders—bondholders, trade creditors, tort victims,
employees, and shareholders, to name but a few—are excluded from any recovery but for the whims
of the controlling secured creditor.”); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 816–26 (developing model of
“dominant” secured creditor).
31. The Bankruptcy Code was “designed to counteract the natural tendency of a debtor in distress
to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would expect to do business, at the expense of small
and scattered public investors.” S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796; see also Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest
Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 657, 658–59 (“[B]y giving secured creditors excessive control over business
reorganizations, Chapter 11 no longer effectively balances its two primary goals, the effective
reorganization of businesses and the maximization of asset values for all creditors.”).

05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

640

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/6/2018 9:21 PM

[Vol. 93:631

commandeer Chapter 11 cases, setting up a tension with Jevic’s process
values. I close by briefly sketching opportunities for scholars and
practitioners created by Jevic.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Jevic Bankruptcy
Jevic Transportation Corporation (with affiliated debtors, “Jevic”)
was a New Jersey trucking company that began operations in 1981.32 In
2006, Sun Capital Partners (Sun), a private equity firm, acquired Jevic
with money borrowed from CIT Group (CIT) in a “leveraged buyout”
(LBO).33 In 2008, unable to service the LBO debt, Jevic went into
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.34 At the time of filing, it owed $53 million to
senior secured creditors Sun and CIT, and over $20 million to tax and
general unsecured creditors.35 It had about 1,700 employees, most of
whom it laid off shortly before bankruptcy.36
1. The Bankruptcy Litigations
There were two main litigations during Jevic’s bankruptcy. First,
petitioners, a group of former Jevic truck drivers, sued both Jevic and
32. See Emergency Motion for Interim & Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors-In-Possession to
Enter into Senior Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement & Obtain Postpetition Financing Pursuant
to Sections 363 & 364 of the Bankruptcy Code; (II) Granting Liens, Security Interests &
Superpriority Claims; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral; (IV) Affording Adequate
Protection to Prepetition Lenders; & (V) Providing for the Payment of Secured Prepetition
Indebtedness ¶ 8, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2008)
[hereinafter DIP Motion].
33. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 980 (2017). In a leveraged
buyout:
[A]n acquirer may form a wholly owned subsidiary to buy the stock of the debtor (D) from D’s
pre-acquisition shareholders. The acquirer finances the acquisition by borrowing a significant
portion of the purchase price, liability which it causes D to assume after closing, secured by
D’s assets. The (borrowed) purchase price is then remitted to D’s pre-acquisition shareholders.
This has the effect of giving D’s selling shareholders the benefit of using D’s assets to gain
priority over D’s pre-bankruptcy unsecured creditors, who will be junior in right to LBO
lenders with liens encumbering D’s assets.
Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial Power,
Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1220.
34. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 980 (“Just two years after Sun’s buyout, Jevic . . . filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.”).
35. Id.
36. Czyzewski v. Jevic Transp., Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 496 B.R. 151, 154–55 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2013).
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Sun claiming that they had violated state and federal Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification (WARN) Acts, which require a company to
give workers at least sixty days’ notice before their termination (the
“WARN suit”).37 The drivers won summary judgment against Jevic, but
not against Sun, leaving a $12.4 million wage claim against the debtor,
of which about $8.3 million was entitled to be paid before any
distributions could be made to general unsecured creditors.38 “[T]his,”
the Supreme Court majority observed emphatically, was “the point to
remember.”39
Second, the Bankruptcy Court authorized the committee representing
Jevic’s unsecured creditors (“creditors’ committee” or “committee”) to
sue Sun and CIT for harm allegedly caused by the LBO (the “LBO
suit”).40 Any recoveries from such a suit would belong to the bankruptcy
estate.41 The committee alleged that by virtue of the LBO, Sun and CIT
had “hastened Jevic’s bankruptcy by saddling it with debts that it
couldn’t service.”42 In 2011, the Bankruptcy Court held that the
committee’s claims survived a motion to dismiss.43
2. The Structured Dismissal
While the WARN suit proceeded, Sun, CIT, Jevic, and the creditors’
committee negotiated a settlement of the LBO suit. The settlement
provided the following:
The Bankruptcy Court would dismiss the LBO suit with prejudice;

37. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 980 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:21-2 (West
2011)).
38. Id. (citing In re Jevic Holding Corp., 496 B.R. 151).
39. Id. Eventually Sun prevailed on the ground that Sun was not the workers’ employer at the
relevant times. See generally In re Jevic Holding Corp., 656 F. App’x 617 (3d Cir. 2016).
Specifically, $8.3 million of the drivers’ claims were entitled to fourth priority in distributions as
unpaid wage claims. See Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 980.
40. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981.
41. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (6) (2012); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 552–53 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that a
creditor’s committee can bring a derivative action on behalf of the estate)).
42. Id. (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2015)).
43. Id. (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), No. 08-11006 (BLS), 2011 WL 4345204 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15, 2011)).
Specifically, the committee had adequately pleaded claims of preferential transfer under Bankruptcy
Code section 547 and of fraudulent transfer under section 548. Id.
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CIT would pay $2 million in legal fees of the committee’s counsel;
and
Sun would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to a
trust to pay taxes and administrative expenses.44
The estate would distribute the remainder on a pro rata basis to the
low-priority general unsecured creditors,45 “but . . . would not distribute
anything to petitioners (who, by virtue of their WARN judgment, held
an $8.3 million mid-level-priority wage claim against the estate).”46
Thereafter, the bankruptcy case would be dismissed, leaving all earlier
court orders in effect.47
As a practical matter, these elements, known collectively as a
“structured dismissal,” had two key consequences. First, the distribution
would skip the “mid-priority” claims of the drivers, even though there
was no dispute about the drivers’ entitlement to them. Second, the
dismissal would free Sun and CIT from liability for the failed LBO they
had orchestrated, which apparently led to the company’s demise. Despite
dismissing the bankruptcy, the truck drivers would be enjoined from
suing Sun and CIT in state court for causes of action created by New
Jersey’s fraudulent transfer law.48 In other words, the structured
44. Id.
45. Although Sun was principally Jevic’s shareholder, it had acquired a lien on about $2 million
of Jevic’s assets by subrogation to CIT’s rights when it (Sun) paid a portion of the CIT secured loan.
See Joint Motion of the Debtors, CIT, Sun Capital & the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 349 & 1112(b) & Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Entry of an Order: (I)
Approving Settlement Agreement & Releasing Claims; (II) Dismissing the Debtors’ Cases Upon
Implementation of Settlement; & (III) Granting Related Relief Filed ¶ 7, In re Jevic Holding Corp.,
No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Dismissal Motion].
46. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981. Apparently, Sun insisted on skipping the petitioners’ priority wage
claims because Sun did not want to fund litigation “against itself.” Id. (“Sun’s counsel
acknowledging before the Bankruptcy Court that ‘Sun probably does care where the money goes
because you can take judicial notice that there’s a pending WARN action against Sun by the WARN
plaintiffs. And if the money goes to the WARN plaintiffs, then you’re funding someone who is
suing you who otherwise doesn’t have funds and is doing it on a contingent fee basis.’” (quoting In
re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177–78 n.4)).
47. Id.
48. As discussed below, section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the effect of dismissals. It
provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a
case . . . (3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested
immediately before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2012). This
means that dismissal should “undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable.” H.R. REP. NO. 95595, at 338 (1977). In Jevic, the Settlement Agreement released Sun and CIT from “third party
actions or proceedings relating in any way to, or arising from any transaction with or in connection
to, the Debtors or their estates of whatever kind or nature . . . including, without limitation, any and
all claims asserted in or which could have been asserted in, or which related to the subject matter of
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dismissal in Jevic would have both stripped the drivers of their priority
claims in bankruptcy and forbidden them from pursuing any other
remedies against those who allegedly harmed them outside of
bankruptcy.
3. The Problem as Framed—Priority Skipping
The drivers objected, arguing that the structured dismissal “violated
the [Bankruptcy] Code’s priority scheme because it skipped
petitioners—who, by virtue of their WARN judgment, had mid-levelpriority claims against estate assets—and distributed estate money to
low-priority general unsecured creditors.”49
The Bankruptcy Court acknowledged this problem, but approved the
structured dismissal anyway due to “the ‘dire circumstances’” facing the
estate and its creditors.50 Jevic had borrowed more money from CIT
during the case, secured on a “super-priority” basis by its assets, so that
it apparently had no unencumbered assets.51 It was, in the vernacular,
“administratively insolvent,” meaning that it could not pay first-priority
expenses of administering the estate, much less any other “mid-priority”
creditors, such as the drivers. The Bankruptcy Court “predicted that
without the settlement and dismissal, there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of
a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors,”
CIT and Sun.52 Thus, “[a] confirmable Chapter 11 plan was unattainable.
And there would be no funds to operate, investigate, or litigate were the
case converted to a [liquidation] proceeding in Chapter 7.”53
The drivers appealed the order approving the structured dismissal to
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.54 Although
the district judge also recognized that the distributions under the
structured settlement violated the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme,

the Adversary Proceeding . . . .” Exhibit A to Joint Motion: Settlement Agreement ¶ 2(c)(i), In re
Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2012). Among other things, this
would have enjoined the drivers from suing under New Jersey’s fraudulent transfer act. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 25:2-20 (West 2015).
49. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981.
50. Id. at 982 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 57a, Jevic, 137 S. Ct. 973 (No. 15-649)).
51. This financing, and the power that it gave CIT over the process, are discussed in detail infra
section III.B.1.
52. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 982 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 58a).
53. Id.
54. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), No. 08-11006(BLS), 2014 WL
268613 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
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she nevertheless approved the settlement because, she reasoned, the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules were “not a bar to the approval of the
settlement as [the settlement] is not a reorganization plan.”55
A divided Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court.56 The majority held that structured dismissals need not always
respect priority.57 Congress, the appellate court explained, had only
“codified the absolute priority rule . . . in the specific context of plan
confirmation.”58 As a result, the court reasoned, bankruptcy courts could,
“in rare instances like this one, approve structured dismissals that do not
strictly adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.”59
Judge Scirica concurred in part, but also dissented for three reasons.
First, he questioned whether the proposed distributions were, in fact,
wealth-maximizing, as the proponents had claimed.60 Rather, he noted,
the priority-skipping distribution “deviates from the Code’s priority
scheme so as to maximize the recovery that certain creditors receive,” at
the expense of higher priority creditors (the drivers).61 Second,
anticipating Justice Breyer’s concerns about process quality, he worried
that the structured dismissal here was a substitute for a plan without the
procedural protections of a plan.62 Third, he noted, the secured creditors
here should have had no power to make a “gift” to junior unsecured
creditors, as they had sought, because the settlement proceeds were
property of the estate—not property of CIT or Sun to give as they
wished.63

55. Id. at *3. This was an especially odd finding, as the exit path most likely to permit deviations
of this sort would have been a plan, which permits greater flexibility in altering priorities than a
Chapter 7 liquidation.
56. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017); id. at 186 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 183–84 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id. at 180.
60. Id. at 187 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 188 (“Although the combination of the settlement and structured dismissal here does
not, strictly speaking, constitute a sub rosa plan—the hallmark of such a plan is that it dictates the
terms of a reorganization plan, and the settlement here does not do so—the broader concerns
underlying the sub rosa doctrine are at play.”).
63. Id. (“Critical to this analysis is the fact that the money paid by the secured creditors in the
settlement was property of the estate. A cause of action held by the debtor is property of the
estate.”).
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Jevic in the Supreme Court—Priority in Final Distributions

Before the Supreme Court, the “basic question” was, “[c]an a
bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for
distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the
affected creditors’ consent?”64 The Court’s “simple answer to this
complicated question” was “‘no.’”65
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion opened with the sweeping claim
that “[t]he [Bankruptcy] Code’s priority system constitutes a basic
underpinning of business bankruptcy law.”66 This priority system applies
in either of the two major exit paths envisioned by Congress: a
reorganization plan under Chapter 11 or a liquidation supervised by a
trustee under Chapter 7.67 The structured dismissal devised by the
settling parties in Jevic was simply an end-run around this system; the
Court would not tolerate it.
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes three sets of “ordinary” priority
rules: (1) those provided by state law, with respect to secured claims,
which confer priority rights (liens) in a debtor’s property, such as those
held by CIT on Jevic’s assets;68 (2) statutory priority rights under
Bankruptcy Code section 507, such as the one giving the drivers’ wage
claims fourth (“mid”) priority as unsecured claims;69 and (3) the
common law “absolute priority rule,” which applies to plans of
reorganization and (now we know) structured dismissals, and more
generally contemplates that creditors have priority over owners (e.g.,
shareholders).70
The Court observed that these priority rules—in particular, the
APR—have “long been considered fundamental to the Bankruptcy
Code’s operation” because, among other reasons, they “enforce a
distribution of the debtor’s assets in an orderly manner . . . in accordance
64. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (“Distributions of estate assets at the termination of a business bankruptcy normally take
place through a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 plan, and both are governed by priority. In
Chapter 7 liquidations, priority is an absolute command—lower priority creditors cannot receive
anything until higher priority creditors have been paid in full.” (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 725–726
(2012))).
68. For example, under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs security
interests in personal property and has been enacted in all fifty states.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a).
70. Id. § 1129(b). The Bankruptcy Code also recognizes contractual subordination, which is the
creation of priority by agreement. Id. § 510(a).
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with established principles rather than on the basis of the inside
influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor.”71 Thus, the
Court noted, the APR is “quite appropriately, bankruptcy’s most
important and famous rule”72 and is “the cornerstone of reorganization
practice and theory.”73
This was important, for it showed that the majority understood that
plans and liquidations were the two main routes out of bankruptcy, and
that a kind of “absolute” priority structure applied in either case. If
Congress had intended to permit non-consensual deviations—a third
way out, such as the Jevic structured dismissal—it would have said so.
“[W]e would expect to see some affirmative indication of intent if
Congress actually meant to make structured dismissals a backdoor
means to achieve the exact kind of nonconsensual priority-violating final
distributions that the Code prohibits in Chapter 7 liquidations and
Chapter 11 plans.”74 Because Congress does not “hide elephants in
mouseholes,”75 the majority concluded that the priority rules that applied
in a Chapter 11 plan or a Chapter 7 liquidation should also apply in a
structured dismissal.76
B. Problems with Structured Dismissals—“Cause” and Effects
Although Jevic’s holding focused on the priority rules that apply in
final distributions of estate property, it was driven by the particular
mechanism used to resolve the case, a “structured dismissal,” a
procedural concoction neither defined nor contemplated by the
Bankruptcy Code.77 The Jevic majority was careful to say that it took no
position on the propriety of structured dismissals.78 Parsimony here is
not surprising because no one in Jevic challenged the legality of

71. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 984 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 33 (1994)).
72. Id. (quoting Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1243, 1236).
73. Id. (quoting Markell, supra note 12, at 123).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
76. Id. at 984–86.
77. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion relied on a definition supplied by an American Bankruptcy
Institute study, characterizing a structured dismissal as a “‘hybrid dismissal and [plan] confirmation
order . . . that . . . typically dismisses the case while, among other things, approving certain
distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party releases, enjoining certain conduct by
creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or unwinding transactions undertaken during the
case.’” Id. at 979 (quoting ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 270).
78. Id. at 985 (the Court “express[ed] no view about the legality of structured dismissals in
general”).
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structured dismissals, as such. But it is unfortunate, because structured
dismissals are governed by a “for cause” standard, which provides little
guidance to lower courts.79 The absence of clear standards has, in turn,
created ambiguities that powerful stakeholders such as senior creditors
(here, CIT and Sun) may exploit to control the reorganization process, as
nearly happened in Jevic.
1. Approval Standards—“Cause”
Structured dismissals are governed by several provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, which give bankruptcy judges a wide berth in
deciding whether to approve them. First, Bankruptcy Code section 1112
provides that a court may dismiss a Chapter 11 case for “cause,”80 and
lists sixteen non-exclusive factors that count as cause to grant a
dismissal motion.81 These include “substantial or continuing loss to or
diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation.”82 This is important because Chapter 11 debtors,
including Jevic, often enter bankruptcy with assets fully encumbered (or
nearly so). This leaves them at or near the point of administrative
insolvency—a financial condition where the debtor cannot even pay its
operating expenses during the case.83 If a corporate debtor is
administratively insolvent, there may well be little “likelihood of
rehabilitation,” and thus “cause” to dismiss the case.84
Second, structured dismissals are governed in part by Bankruptcy
Code section 363, which deals with non-ordinary-course uses of
property.85 When a debtor, such as Jevic, commences a Chapter 11 case,
79. See In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2014) (“‘Not much law, statutory
or otherwise, exists regarding structured dismissals . . . .’” (quoting In re Buffet Partners, No. 1430699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014))).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case
under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors
and the estate, for cause . . . .”).
81. Id. § 1112(b)(4)(A). One could quibble with the number sixteen. Some enumerated factors
actually contain sub-factors. See, e.g., id. § 1112(b)(4)(J) (listing “failure to file a disclosure
statement, or to file or confirm a plan, within the time fixed by this title or by order of the court”).
82. Id. § 1112(b)(4)(A).
83. Administrative insolvency means that a debtor is unable to pay the ongoing expenses of
operating in bankruptcy, which courts often find to be grounds to convert or dismiss a case. See,
e.g., In re Acme Cake Co., 495 B.R. 212, 217 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).
84. But that may prove too much because debtors are so frequently near administrative
insolvency. See ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 173 (noting that “‘administratively insolvent’ cases
have become more common”).
85. To determine whether a transaction falls outside the ordinary course of business, courts utilize
both a “horizontal” and “vertical” test. The horizontal test evaluates whether, from an industry-wide
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an “estate” is created, comprised of all of the company’s property.86
Corporate managers become fiduciaries of the estate, for the benefit of
general unsecured creditors,87 as “debtor in possession” (DIP). While the
DIP may run the business as usual during bankruptcy, managers may not
use estate (company) property outside the ordinary course absent court
approval.88
Because a structured dismissal seeks to make a final distribution of
estate property, a structured dismissal would do just that. Courts tend to
defer to management’s good faith business judgment regarding nonordinary uses of property under section 363.89 As with “cause” to
dismiss, it will not be difficult to show a business justification where a
debtor is administratively insolvent. In essence, proponents would argue
that the structured dismissal for purposes of section 363 is a fancy “sale”
of all of the debtor’s assets. If, as happened in Jevic below, the DIP and
senior creditors have agreed to this, courts understandably find
themselves tempted to go along, even if “mid-priority” creditors object.
Third, because a structured dismissal also appears to involve a
“settlement,” it is governed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9019,90 a rule with even less content than the sales provisions of section
363. This rule—not technically a part of the Bankruptcy Code—provides
simply that “[o]n motion by the [DIP] and after notice and a hearing, the
court may approve a compromise or settlement.”91
Courts recognize that approval of a proposed settlement is not a “fait
accompli.”92 They must assess it under some standard. In 1968, the
Supreme Court held in the pre-Code Protective Committee for
Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson93 case

perspective, the transaction at issue is one that is commonly taken by companies in the industry. The
vertical test evaluates whether, from a hypothetical creditor’s perspective, “the transaction subjects
a creditor to economic risk of a nature different than those he accepted when he decided to extend
credit.” In re Nellson Nutraceutical Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 797 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). Failure to satisfy
either the horizontal or vertical test may render a transaction outside the ordinary course. See In re
Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1992).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
87. Id. §§ 1107–1108.
88. Id. § 363(b)(1).
89. In re Kennedy, 552 B.R. 183, 194 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2016); In re Shary, 152 B.R. 724, 725
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); see also Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
90. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
91. Id.
92. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 551–52 (3d Cir. 2015).
93. 390 U.S. 414 (1968).
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that settlements must be “fair and equitable.”94 This phrase has become
code (and Code) for “absolute priority.” One of the main doctrinal points
of contention in Jevic was whether this notion of priority applied to the
settlement in Jevic or only, as the lower courts held, to plans of
reorganization, whose rules do indeed codify the “fair and equitable”
standard as one of absolute priority.95 While the Jevic Court decisively
answered this particular doctrinal question—the absolute priority
standard governs final distributions in Chapter 11, even if made via a
settlement—the majority opinion did not provide clarity about how
bankruptcy courts should assess settlements generally.
This, too, is a problem because, in addition to (or perhaps in lieu of)
TMT Trailer Ferry’s absolute priority rule, courts have held that they
must weigh the “value of the claim that is being compromised against
the value to the estate of the acceptance of the compromise proposal.”96
This, in turn, asks a court to apply a multifactor test which, at least in the
Third Circuit (the source of Jevic), is set out in In re Martin97: “(1) the
probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in
collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense,
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount
interest of the creditors.”98
There is, unfortunately, no necessary connection between any of these
four “Martin” factors and the absolute priority rule upheld in Jevic.
These factors assume the existence of a litigated dispute. While that was
the case in Jevic, it need not be, because ordinary adversarial litigation
need not occur in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Indeed, as explained below,
given senior creditors’ power to usurp the Chapter 11 process, such
lawsuits are likely to dwindle. Moreover, it provides no guidance on
how a court is supposed to decide what constitutes the “paramount
interests of creditors.” If we care only (or mostly) about senior creditors,
then whatever they want will be “paramount.” If, instead, we care about

94. Id. at 424. Although TMT Trailer Ferry involved a compromise and settlement, it occurred
before promulgation of Rule 9019. Courts under current law nevertheless look to it for guidance
when asked to approve settlements in bankruptcy. See Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 462–63 (2d Cir. 2007).
95. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983–84 (2017); see also 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
96. In re World Health Alts., Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 296 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
97. 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996).
98. Id.; see also In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 551–52 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying Martin
factors).
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other mid- or low-priority creditors, we might take a different view.99
Although Congress designed the Bankruptcy Code to protect the latter,
Chapter 11 is increasingly dominated by the former, aided by
innovations such as structured dismissals.
2. Problems with Structured Dismissals—Effect
The standards by which courts should assess structured dismissals are
unclear, leaving judges exposed to pressure from senior creditors who
wish to use them to resolve Chapter 11 cases to their liking. While this
contributes to uncertainty, the harder doctrinal question, only partially
answered by Jevic, involves their effect if approved.
As noted above, Bankruptcy Code section 349 provides, in pertinent
part, that “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a
case . . . (3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such
property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case
under this title.”100 Thus, as with the decision whether to dismiss,
altering the prebankruptcy status quo through dismissal depends on a
showing of “cause.”
The statute provides no examples of what might constitute “cause,” so
courts have looked to legislative history. Congress observed that
dismissal should “undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable.”101
This means that dismissal should restore the status quo ante, so that
creditors could pursue their remedies in other fora, such as state court. In
Jevic, Justice Breyer recognized that the “cause” exception Congress had
in mind involved reliance interests developed during the case.102 For
example, if a creditor received consideration for releasing liens during
the case, the creditor should retain the consideration if it cannot get its
lien back.103 Yet, many of the important features of a structured
99. Compare In re Buffet Partners, No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *2 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014) (“[T]he best interests of creditors test focuses on the interest of the entire
creditor body; it does not focus on individual creditor interests.”), with Rollex Corp. v. Associated
Materials, Inc. (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.), 14 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting
that “the court must consider the interests of all of the creditors” and that the best interests of
creditors are “not served by merely tallying the votes of the unsecured creditors and yielding to the
majority interest”).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b).
101. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338 (1977).
102. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 984 (2017) (“[T]his
provision appears designed to give courts the flexibility to ‘make the appropriate orders to protect
rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338)).
103. See, e.g., In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991) (reversing lower court’s approval
of a dismissal order that stripped a secured creditor of its collateral).
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dismissal—in Jevic, the final distributions and release—would not
reflect reliance on actions taken during the case. Instead, those actions
altered the prebankruptcy status quo in reliance on actions to end the
case.
After Jevic, those who wish to use structured dismissals may face at
least three questions about their effect. First, the majority opinion
focused on one type of priority skipping—“vertical”—that meant that
seniors and juniors could not ignore the rights of those in the middle. 104
But, there is also “horizontal” priority, which considers whether, or to
what extent, stakeholders with the same priority receive the same
treatment.105 That is, could the structured dismissal in Jevic have paid
some but not all of the mid-priority claims of the drivers in order to
“purchase” their consent? Traditional resolution mechanisms—Chapter
11 plans and Chapter 7 liquidations—generally resist this, resting on the
maxim “equity is equality.”106 The rules governing structured dismissals,
however, say nothing about it, and neither does the majority in Jevic.
Second, Jevic does not address the related practice of “gifting,” where
senior creditors use a portion of their recovery to induce junior creditors
to vote for a plan.107 Economically, gifting can have the same effect as
the forbidden distributions in Jevic, because distributions may “skip”
priority, but it is rationalized on a different theory—that the senior
104. See generally Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter
11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998).
105. See id. at 231.
106. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8 (2006) (“[T]he priority scheme of the
Code and the requirement of equal treatment of creditors within the same class is an implementation
of the equity maxim that ‘equity is equality’—like creditors are to be treated alike.” (footnotes
omitted)). In Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b) implements this by providing that a
reorganization plan may not “discriminate unfairly” amongst creditors in the same class. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(1) (2012). Discrimination may nevertheless occur, and often arises in the context of socalled “death-trap” provisions of Chapter 11 plans. These will reward a class with better treatment
for voting for the plan, even if doing so provides better treatment than received by a similarly
situated class. As the influential Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently
explained, “death-trap . . . provisions have long been customary in Chapter 11 plans.” In re MPM
Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4637175, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014)
(citing In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007); In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 714, 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1992)).
107. Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 514–16 (3d Cir. 2005), with
Hargreaves v. Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc. (In re Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc.), No. 17-10949-KJC, 2017
WL 3326453, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017) (distinguishing Armstrong and affirming
confirmation of plan that made a “gift from senior lenders to certain, but not all, classes of general
unsecured creditors”), In re World Health Alts., Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 297 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
(approving senior creditor “gift”), and In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 549 (3d Cir. 2015)
(same).
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creditor is using “its” property and not the estate’s.108 The bankruptcy
process should be indifferent to the ways in which a creditor uses its
property and so, on this view, gifting is outside the purview of
bankruptcy judges. Although an important and controversial practice—
courts appear to be split on whether it is permissible109—Jevic offers no
direct guidance on whether it may continue.
Third, the distributive rights vindicated in Jevic are hardly the only
ones that a structured dismissal might compromise. In Jevic, for
example, the senior creditors sought the structured dismissal in part to
escape potential liability for the failed LBO, which might have
constituted a fraudulent transfer.110 To avoid this liability, the structured
dismissal approved would have prevented anyone—including the
objecting drivers—from suing the senior creditors on these theories
outside of bankruptcy, after dismissal.111 In principle, one party cannot
“agree” to eliminate the rights of another, but that is what the structured
dismissal sought to do.112
II.

CONSENT—THE SOLUTION?

Jevic suggests that the foregoing problems with structured dismissals
could be cured with “the affected creditors’ consent.”113 While this has
intuitive appeal—bankruptcy is designed to promote negotiated

108. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 549.
109. Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 514–16 (forbidding inter-class transfers
to junior stakeholders), with In re World Health Alts., 344 B.R. at 297 (approving secured creditor
“gift” to general unsecured creditors).
110. As explained below, the LBO suit was predicated on the view that transfers in the LBO
(including liens granted to secure CIT’s loan financing the transaction) were constructively
fraudulent under, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548.
111. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement releases CIT and Sun from:
[A]ny and all claims or counterclaims, causes of action, remedies, damages, liabilities, debts,
suits, demands, actions, costs, expenses, fees, controversies, set-offs, third party actions or
proceedings relating in any way to, or arising from any transaction with or in connection to, the
Debtors or their estates of whatever kind or nature . . . including, without limitation, any and all
claims asserted in or which could have been asserted in, or which related to the subject matter
of the Adversary Proceeding, or which are based on any avoidance or other powers afforded
the Estate Releasing Parties under the Bankruptcy Code . . . .
Exhibit A to Joint Motion: Settlement Agreement, supra note 48, ¶ 2(c)(i).
112. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986)
(“[P]arties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a
third party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without that party’s
agreement.”).
113. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017).
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solutions114—it simply pushes the question back one step: what is
“consent” in this context? Under a Chapter 11 plan, consent is shown by
a creditor vote.115 But, because the Bankruptcy Code creates no
mechanism to vote on structured dismissals—or most important matters
other than reorganization plans—courts after Jevic will be asked to think
more seriously about what constitutes consent in Chapter 11 cases,
which will be challenging for reasons discussed in this Part.
A.

Problems with Consent

Even outside of bankruptcy, Prosser noted, the question of “consent”
“is one of the most complex and difficult in the entire area of the law.”116
The scale and multilateral character of most Chapter 11 cases only
exacerbate this.
Problems of consent here usually take one of three forms: (1) false
positives; (2) false negatives; and (3) strategic dissent.
A “false positive” means that there is some affirmative indication
that a party has agreed to something in a case, but the assent is
compromised. It may be the product of mistake, duress, bad faith,
or worse.
A “false negative” means that there is no affirmative indication of
assent or dissent (objection), but a judge mistakenly interprets
silence as assent.
A “strategic dissent” is an objection made not on the merits, but
instead for some other instrumental end.117
While all three are problematic, the second may be worst because it is
so difficult to know what to infer from silence. If, for example, the
drivers in Jevic had not retained separate counsel and objected
114. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in
Bankruptcy, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 239, 256 (2016).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (setting forth plan voting rules). Although beyond the scope of this paper,
“consent” is also an issue in municipal bankruptcies under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
55, 105 (2016) (“The Detroit court used . . . [the consent standard under Chapter 9] as an oversight
tool. That approach puts a premium on a municipality exercising free choice.”).
116. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 112 (5th
ed. 1984).
117. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (“[J]udges are often
reluctant to appoint an examiner if there is no apparent benefit to the estate or if a party requests one
for transparently strategic reasons.”).

05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

654

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/6/2018 9:21 PM

[Vol. 93:631

vigorously to the structured dismissal, should the bankruptcy court have
approved the settlement anyway, on the theory that silence was consent?
1. We Know It When We See It
Professors Klee and Bussel have spent the most time thinking about
what consent means in bankruptcy, arguing that it is (or should be) a
“contextualized inquiry that draws on both experience and judgment.”118
They identify ten factors (“no doubt there are many others”) that they
“believe are often relevant to fixing appropriate consent requirements
and standards in bankruptcy.”119 These factors balance “legitimacy and
autonomy values . . . against the efficiency of dictating a given result by
mandatory rule.”120
Klee and Bussel’s instincts seem consistent with the reasoning of
Jevic—process-quality matters121—but their approach may leave too
many degrees of freedom. First, it is not clear whether they are
describing the matters as to which consent may be an appropriate
resolution standard or, instead, how to decide if there is, in fact,
consent.122 It may be one, the other, or both, but they do not say.123
Second, if we take the question to involve the latter—have parties
consented?—it is not clear which factors matter, or how courts should
weight them in a dispute. Consider their first two: the “sophistication,
knowledge and bargaining power of the putative consenting parties;”
and the “number, and degree of geographical or other dispersion, of the
putative consenting parties.”124 It is not clear how a bankruptcy judge in
a case with hundreds or thousands of creditors can know these things
with confidence. Judges could require representatives in the case—in
118. Bussel & Klee, supra note 15, at 718.
119. Id. at 717; see also id. at 719 (“[L]egitimacy and autonomy values must be weighed against
the efficiency of dictating a given result by mandatory rule.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. (“[W]e . . . should be wary of sacrificing too quickly the legitimacy consent confers on
the altar of efficient administration or other bankruptcy values.”).
122. Id. at 718 (writing courts should “consider . . . the extent to which consent is a necessary or
sufficient predicate to the transformation of legal rights”).
123. Take a simple example. Creditors with statutory priority, such as the drivers in Jevic, may
consent to waive their priority rights, so this would be a matter as to which consent is a permissible
resolution mechanism. But, in the context of confirming a plan of reorganization, a court must find
that the proposed plan is “feasible.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012). In theory, this is an
independent judicial assessment; no amount of “consent” should supplant the court’s independent
judgment. Klee and Bussel do not tell us whether consent should be effective in both cases, or only
in the first.
124. Bussel & Klee, supra note 15, at 718.
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particular, counsel to the unsecured creditors’ committee—to obtain
something like proxies from each creditor as to each matter. But
unsophisticated parties may mistakenly agree (a false positive). More
likely, parties may simply say nothing (possibly a false negative). In any
case, how much money would we want a debtor’s estate to spend on
this? Voting is expensive. While its costs are clear, its benefits are often
opaque.
Klee and Bussel would seem to give to bankruptcy judges a great deal
of discretion in deciding when consent is appropriate, and how to decide
whether it exists. These judges would, to paraphrase Justice Stewart,
“know it when they see it.”125 This, however, provides little guidance for
bankruptcy judges trying to resolve difficult problems in complex cases.
2.

Consent and Economic Stakes

Apart from indeterminacy, consent presents other problems: whose
consent (or dissent) counts, and how do we decide? The Jevic majority
spoke of “affected” creditors, suggesting that we should care about the
consent of parties with a substantive economic stake in the outcome.126 It
was not hard to see that the creditors in Jevic were “affected” by the
structured dismissal there: no one disputed their priority, or the fact that
estate property (proceeds of the fraudulent transfer settlement) would
have “skipped” over that priority had the Court upheld the lower courts.
The Jevic drivers were, in the vernacular, “in the money.” But that will
not always be so clear.
In In re Petersburg Regency LLC,127 for example, the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that objections of
shareholders of an insolvent corporation did not count.128 The
Petersburg debtor was a hotel that suffered hurricane damage; its only
asset was about $9 million in insurance proceeds.129 The senior creditors
were undersecured, meaning their liens fully encumbered the assets.
They and all non-insider creditors agreed to a structured dismissal in

125. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today
attempt to further define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But
I know it when I see it . . . .”).
126. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017).
127. 540 B.R. 508 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
128. Id. at 531.
129. Id. at 532–33.
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which the senior creditors shared their recovery with junior creditors, but
not with the debtor’s principals.130 “Unlike Jevic,” the court noted,
[N]o class of creditors—priority or otherwise—is being
“skipped” and there is unanimous support for the Settlement
among the Debtor’s non-insider creditors. Only the [equity
owners], as insiders, oppose the Settlement and Structured
Dismissal, as their interests are directly opposed to the noninsider creditors. Thus, this Court finds and determines that the
Settlement and Structured Dismissal is plainly in the best
interests of the Debtor’s creditors and the estate.131
Because the Petersburg court concluded that the principals were “out of
the money,” their objections would not prevent the court from approving
the structured dismissal.132
This, however, begs two questions. First, who gets to decide that the
objectors were out of the money? In many cases, it will not be difficult
to know, because the debtor will obviously be insolvent. But valuation is
often one of the more difficult and disputed challenges bankruptcy
courts face. Because reorganization may seek to reallocate the future
value of a business to today’s stakeholders, the risks and costs of error
are high. Although Jevic was not a reorganization, the senior creditors
there could plausibly have claimed that the mid-priority drivers were out
of the money, because the debtor’s assets were fully encumbered.
Absent the fraudulent transfer claims asserted in the LBO suit, who
would have been in a position to challenge that?
Second, why are economic stakes the only ones that matter? For some
years, a small group of academics argued that bankruptcy should be
understood as involving more than simply economic adjustments: it
should advance other normative values.133 Courts have largely ignored
this approach, at least as a substantive matter. Indeed, even when the
Bankruptcy Code specifically designates a non-economic actor—the
United States Trustee (UST)—to monitor and challenge matters in
Chapter 11 cases, judges are skeptical. In In re Buffet Partners,134 for
example,135 the parties sought a structured dismissal for the reasons one
130. Id. at 545.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 543.
133. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 2124, 2150 (2003) (discussing “[b]ankruptcy law’s struggle to manage a normative ‘departure’
without normative ‘offense’”).
134. No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014).
135. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (citing In re Buffet Partners, 2014 WL 3735804, at *1).
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would expect: the debtor’s assets had been sold, and there was only a pot
of cash to distribute among creditors.136 The creditors’ committee and
debtor agreed to settle and dismiss the case and sent notice of the
proposed structured dismissal to creditors.137 Only the UST objected.138
In approving the structured dismissal over the UST’s objection, the court
observed:
It is important to emphasize that not one party with an economic
stake in the case has objected to the dismissal in this manner.
While this fact is not outcome determinative, it is still worthy of
consideration. All of the following parties affirmatively assent to
the proposed dismissal: the Debtor, the Lender, and the
Committee, which represents a large portion of the unsecured
debt. The UST is the sole objecting party.139
The intuition behind Buffet Partners is easy to understand: Chapter 11
is a system to adjust economic losses, and, except when acting in a
pecuniary capacity, the government should not impede an efficient
mechanism for doing that. Yet, simply saying that we should consider
only the objections of economic stakeholders ignores the reality that
Chapter 11 is a hybrid, public-private process. Because it occurs in and
around courts, it is (or should be) more than simply a negotiated
reallocation of wealth. How to determine which economic stakes count
for purposes of determining consent, and whether (or to what extent) the
consent of non-economic participants should count, will be difficult
questions going forward. Jevic tells us nothing about this.

136. In re Buffet Partners, 2014 WL 3735804, at *1 (“There now remains a fixed sum of money
to be distributed.”).
137. Id. (“The Settlement Motion was noticed out . . . .”).
138. Id. (“The United States Trustee was the only party to object.”). The status of the UST is
somewhat unusual. Its officers (“trustees” and their assistants) are public officials who “protect the
integrity of the bankruptcy system.” In re Youk-See, 450 B.R. 312, 323 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); see
also Morgenstern v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1990)
(describing the United States trustee as “a watchdog rather than an advocate” protecting the public
interest). The program’s director, Clifford White, recently testified before Congress to the ostensible
non-economic interests that the UST represents. Director Clifford J. White III of the Executive
Office for U.S. Trustees Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law at a Hearing on Oversight of U.S. Trustee
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/directorclifford-j-white-iii-executive-office-united-states-trustees-testifies-us-hous-0
[https://perma.cc/V8Z2-5JUU] (“The Jevic case stands as a good example of the role the USTP can
play in reorganization cases. As the only neutral party and one without a pecuniary interest, we are
able to ensure that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are followed by all parties to the case.”).
139. In re Buffet Partners, 2014 WL 3735804, at *4.
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Consent in Aggregate Litigation

Courts concerned about consent in bankruptcy may also look to the
standards that apply to the settlement of aggregate litigations. The
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law: Aggregate Litigation
(Principles) defines an “aggregate lawsuit” as “a single lawsuit that
encompasses claims or defenses held by multiple parties or represented
persons.”140 These include “mass-tort actions, class actions, derivative
lawsuits, actions naming multiple conspirators, and inventory
settlements.”141 The Principles recognize that “[b]ankruptcy proceedings
also meet this definition and provide helpful examples and lessons,”142
but do not address them specifically.143
Although the Principals do not formally apply to Chapter 11 cases, it
is easy to see the analogy when assessing structured dismissals.
Aggregate lawsuits and Chapter 11 cases both involve many claimants
asserting claims against a common defendant or debtor. The debtor in
Jevic, for example, indicated that it believed it had between 5,001 and
10,000 creditors, and this was not an especially large case, as large cases
go.144 Both likely involve settlements rather than adjudicated resolution
to bring closure to underlying disputes. Both require party consent to
settle, although individuated, affirmative evidence of consent may be
costly and implausible to obtain.145

140. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
141. Id. § 1.02 cmt. a.
142. Id.
143. The ALI did not seek to “set out principles designed to govern these proceedings” for the
rather odd reason that bankruptcy is “regulated by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Id.
The stated reason makes no sense. While there may be cause to treat Chapter 11 cases differently
from the aggregate proceedings that concerned the ALI, the presence or absence of rules of
bankruptcy procedure could not matter. Among other reasons, those rules largely incorporate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to “adversary proceedings” and (to a more limited
extent) “contested matters.” See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 & 9014(c) (defining scope of adversary
proceedings and contested matters in bankruptcy). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure specifically incorporate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on class actions, meaning that
the mechanics of aggregate litigation are formally subsumed in Chapter 11 reorganization. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7023.
144. Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May
20, 2008).
145. Chapter 11 cases are more like “non-class” aggregate lawsuits than class actions, however,
because creditors’ claims will arise from different types of facts, involve different questions of law,
and so make class certification implausible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Alan N.
Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 2045, 2059 (2000) (“The classification of claims under a Chapter 11 plan differs
significantly, however, from the creation of a class for Rule 23 class action purposes.”).
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The “non-class” aggregate lawsuit (or “quasi-class action”146) has
become an important and controversial substitute for formal class
actions. Non-class aggregate litigations present process problems similar
to those involved in structured dismissals. In theory, a court may not
approve the settlement of a non-class aggregate lawsuit unless all parties
consent.147 In practice, however, the settlements of the Zyprexa148 and
Vioxx149 litigations show that crafty lawyers have developed techniques
to make it virtually impossible for their clients to resist.150

146. Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 394
(2011) (arguing that a quasi-class action is “a court’s short-hand description for collective litigation
where numerous plaintiffs are consolidated under simple joinder rules”); see also McKenzie, supra
note 17, at 1016 (“In the quasi-class action, plaintiffs who pursue claims against a defendant are
drawn into an aggregate proceeding in a single forum that effectively monopolizes the resolution of
their claims. . . . Like a bankruptcy case, the quasi-class action is held together by a centralized
forum containing individual claims—claims that are not fused into a single collective governed by a
representative with delegated authority (as in a class action).”).
147. See Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass
Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 165 (1999) (“As interpreted by courts, however, the
aggregate settlement rule forbids lawyers from entering settlement over the objection of any
plaintiff, even when that plaintiff has agreed in advance to be bound by a vote of a majority or a
supermajority.”); Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI’s Principles of the Law
of Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity—and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 718
(2011) (discussing a proposed change to the ethics rules that would allow claimants to “agree in
advance, under certain circumstances, to be bound by a majority vote in favor of a particular
settlement”). But see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 140, § 3.17
(providing the requirements for using informed consent to allow multiple clients to use a substantial
majority vote to accept aggregate settlements).
148. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The
Zyprexa settlement was the result of extensive multi-district litigation across the United States for
personal injuries against the manufacturer of Zyprexa, a prescription drug used to treat
schizophrenia. Id. In Zyprexa, a “contractual nonclass aggregate settlement” occurred, which
Professor Mullenix argues is “a concept that deliberately resonates in the familiar language of the
class action while simultaneously rejecting the class concept in favor of a unit of ‘aggregate claims’
resolved instead by contract.” See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of
Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 541 (2013). From this emerged what she
calls the “judicial invention” of the “quasi-class action,” or simply the “logical extension of, and
corollary to, the contractual nonclass aggregate settlement.” Id. at 542.
149. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature
Pages Hereto (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settle
ment%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf [https://perma.cc/83P6-A72R].
150. As Erichson and Zipursky explain, the lawyers in Vioxx made it very difficult for the clients
to resist settling for two reasons:
First, under the terms of the agreement, for a lawyer to participate in the deal—that is, for any
of the lawyer’s clients to avail themselves of the settlement offer—the lawyer was required to
recommend the settlement to all of the lawyer’s eligible clients. Second, if any clients decided
not to participate in the settlement, the lawyer was required to withdraw from representing the
nonsettling clients. A client wishing to decline the settlement, in other words, faced the
prospect of losing her lawyer and finding that every other lawyer handling Vioxx claims was
similarly unavailable.
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In the quasi-class action, consent will likely be manifest by counsel,
who will represent that their clients have agreed to the settlement.
Assuming the lawyers actually have this authority, it will be fairly easy
for the court to approve the settlement. This may not be a safe
assumption, however, because it is not clear how a court can know that
all plaintiffs have in fact consented or have done so on an informed
basis. Critics worry that the rise of these non-class lawsuits excessively
empowers lawyers, at the risk of harming their clients.151
In form, this resembles the problem in Jevic. There, counsel to the
creditors’ committee had negotiated the structured dismissal with the
debtor and senior creditors. The committee theoretically represented all
unsecured creditors—including the drivers—but its counsel could be
paid only if the bankruptcy court approved the structured dismissal. In
fact, however, the drivers’ objection—and their retention of separate
counsel—indicated that the drivers did not consent. But what if the
drivers had not had separate counsel or had failed to assert a formal
objection? Should the bankruptcy judge have inferred from the presence
of their priority claims that they should have objected, that their silence
was a false negative? Or should the judge infer from silence that they
consented to the settlement—even though it was designed to strip their
right to recover?
The Principles attempt to manage these problems through the lens of
legal ethics. The Principles provide, for example, that counsel must
inform clients of the financial effects of the settlement on both the
clients and counsel:
A lawyer or group of lawyers who represent two or more
claimants on a non-class basis may settle the claims of those
claimants on an aggregate basis provided that each claimant
gives informed consent in writing. Informed consent requires
that each claimant be able to review the settlements of all other
persons subject to the aggregate settlement or the formula by
which the settlement will be divided among all claimants.
Further, informed consent requires that the total financial
interest of claimants’ counsel be disclosed to each claimant.152

Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 266. Nearly all plaintiffs in fact agreed. Id. (“One year later,
the Claims Administrator reported that over 99.79% of the eligible claimants had enrolled.”).
151. Id. at 317 (criticizing non-class settlements because they empower lawyers and “the
empowerment of the lawyer is not purely in service of a better deal for clients. In this setting, the
lawyer acquires more money than any of her clients”).
152. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 140, § 3.17(a).

05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY

6/6/2018 9:21 PM

661

The structured dismissal in Jevic may have flunked the Principles’
standards because it is not clear whether counsel adequately disclosed its
financial interest to creditors.153 Nor is it clear how they could have done
so. If by “counsel” we mean counsel to the settling parties—the debtors,
senior lenders, and creditors’ committee—then their fees may not be
known until after the underlying matters are resolved because these
professionals are paid by the bankruptcy estate. While it may be possible
to estimate their fees along the way, they cannot be paid until the court
approves a formal request for payment through a fee application, which
may be an hourly rate not known until at or near the time of the final
hearing.154 In aggregate litigation, by contrast, it appears that counsel are
often paid a percentage of the settlement’s value, which can be estimated
ex ante.155 There is no obvious reason professional fees in bankruptcy
could not be tailored to satisfy the Principles’ standards. Current
practice, however, would not fit well with them.
4.

Consent and Due Process

Behind the ALI’s concerns about legal ethics are concerns about due
process. The ALI recognizes that the legitimacy of consensual
resolutions of aggregate litigation “is a creature of due process . . . . A
party can be bound [to the settlement] when given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.”156 Although the Principles do not cite it, the
obvious reference here is to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,157 which applies in bankruptcy and in all aggregate litigations.
153. The Order approving the Dismissal Motion approves the payment of $200,000 in
professional fees of the creditors’ committee, Dismissal Order, supra note 5, ¶ 8, but the Dismissal
Motion itself indicates that those fees were subject to future determination, see Dismissal Motion,
supra note 45, ¶ 17 (directing professionals to file fee applications after entry of the Dismissal
Order).
154. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Financial Advisors, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 11,
13 (2011) (“[U]nder § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code and under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2016, all professionals retained by either the debtor or an official committee (most often
a creditors’ committee) must file fee applications with the court before they can be paid from estate
funds.”).
155. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing MultiDistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010) (“Over the long
history of MDLs [multidistrict litigations], judges have awarded lead attorneys billions of dollars in
fees and cost reimbursements. Typically, fee awards range from 4 percent to 6 percent of total
recoveries, but smaller and larger percentages can be found. This practice supposedly rests on the
common fund doctrine, a creature of the law of restitution which undergirds fee awards in class
actions.”).
156. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 140, § 1.05 cmt. c.
157. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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In Mullane, administrators of a trust sought a declaratory judgment to
determine the rights of beneficiaries with respect to a trust corpus.
Although the administrators had the names and addresses of some
beneficiaries, they only published notice of the declaratory judgment
action in newspapers, notice that the Supreme Court viewed as “[no]
more than a feint.”158 The Supreme Court held that “[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to
be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”159
The issue before the Court in Mullane involved two aspects of the
constitutional requirement of notice: (1) what type of notice does due
process require, and (2) who must receive it?160 The opinion is most
famous for the first—it must be sufficiently informative to enable the
recipient to know that a court is about to do something important. The
second, however, focuses on the characteristics of the recipients, and the
lengths to which the administrators had to go to provide individualized
notice. As Tobias Wolff has pointed out, Mullane seems best understood
as asking courts to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the
substantive stakes of potential recipients against the costs of providing
individualized notice.161
Mullane’s sensitivity to cost-benefit analysis seems especially
important in Chapter 11, where the opinion has been relevant for
determining the time and expense to which a corporate debtor must go to
identify creditors, and provide individualized notice of important matters
in the case, in particular the “bar date,” after which claims against the

158. Id. at 315; see also id. at 307–10 (describing the manner in which notice was required to be,
and was, given).
159. Id. at 314.
160. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2098 (2008).
161. Id. at 2099–100 (“The less definite, concrete, and extant a person’s property interest, the less
urgent is the need for providing individualized process to absentees, particularly when the
proceeding is structured so as to provide additional assurance that those interests will be
safeguarded in the class member’s absence. Although not making the point explicit, the Court
suggested a sliding-scale approach to the analysis, with those interests that ‘are so remote as to be
ephemeral’ requiring no individualized process at all.” (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317)). Thus,
“[a] creditor’s identity is ‘reasonably ascertainable’ if that creditor can be identified through
‘reasonably diligent efforts.’” Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1983)). “Reasonable diligence,” in
turn, “does not require ‘impracticable and extended searches . . . in the name of due process.’” Id.
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317).
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debtor may not be asserted.162 Concerns about notice in a Chapter 11
case dominate mass tort bankruptcies, such as those involving asbestos,
where the general harm may be known at the time of bankruptcy, but the
identities of victims are unknown—and unknowable—because the
damage may take many years to manifest itself.163 The Second Circuit’s
recent decision reversing the lower court in the General Motors ignition
switch litigation because the debtor knew the identities of car purchasers
and nonetheless failed to send them notice is a reminder that courts must
take Mullane’s due process values seriously, even in bankruptcy.164
“Due process” is, however, a standard that is both grand and vague. It
purports to instill confidence in the legitimacy of legal process, yet is
quite hazy about how to do so in any given case. We tend to think of due
process as involving binary disputes, in particular efforts by government
to take life, liberty, or property. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, however, the
role of government is opaque and diffuse: bankruptcy judges are
obviously government actors, but they engage in a deliberately complex
set of interactions with participants and their representatives in ways that
make it hard to determine—or to justify spending the money to
determine—whether due process has (or has not) been satisfied. In other
words, due process may be intimately related to consent, but it provides
little concrete guidance on how to identify consent in corporate
reorganizations.165

162. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
Precedent demonstrates that what is required is not a vast, open-ended investigation. . . . The
requisite search instead focuses on the debtor’s own books and records. Efforts beyond a
careful examination of these documents are generally not required. Only those claimants who
are identifiable through a diligent search are “reasonably ascertainable” and hence “known”
creditors.
See Chemetron Corp., 72 F.3d at 346–47 (citations and footnotes omitted).
163. These challenges have led to versions of what Bookman and Noll call “ad hoc procedure,”
which in Chapter 11 takes the form of a “channeling injunction,” forcing asbestos victims to
“channel” their claims against asbestos makers that have gone into bankruptcy through the Chapter
11 process—and specialized trusts created in the reorganizations—which seek to fully and finally
resolve the claims. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 767, 771–74 (2017) (discussing procedure for creating channeling injunction in Chapter 11
cases).
164. See Elliott v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016).
165. Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 669–70 (2008). For a discussion of the role of judges in Chapter 11
cases generally, see Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 571.
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Consent and Closure

Concerns about due process values sharpen a tension embedded in
Jevic. Chapter 11 seeks both to maximize recoveries and to provide
some baseline procedural protections. Sometimes these goals are
consonant; sometimes—as in Jevic—they are not. The best argument for
privileging the distributive over the procedural—the aspiration of the
senior creditors in Jevic and often elsewhere—is closure: bringing the
case efficiently to an end. Closure is, for example, often the strongest
argument for quasi-class action settlements outside of bankruptcy.166 By
inducing (or coercing) clients to settle, the quasi-class settlement
produces finality that benefits the parties and the judicial system.167
Finality is also a key motivation for using Chapter 11. A confirmed
plan can result in the discharge of debt, perhaps the greatest finality a
corporate debtor can hope to achieve with respect to its stakeholders.168
In theory, a discharge is not available if a case is dismissed.169 The
structured dismissal in Jevic, for example, did not contain an explicit
discharge. But it did not need one in order to achieve the same result.
Because it sought a final distribution of all of the debtor’s assets, any
post-dismissal litigation against it would have been pointless: after
dismissal, Jevic would have no assets, and thus be judgment proof. In
the unlikely event the debtor did acquire property after dismissal, the
structured dismissal apparently preserved the liens and priority of
CIT.170 Because it was undersecured, its lien would attach to any such
property, further reducing the likelihood that creditors could collect from
Jevic post-dismissal. Because the debtors in Jevic were entities, the
shareholders (Sun) would not be liable personally for their debts, even
after dismissal. The debtors would simply dissolve under applicable state
law, a natural death that leaves unpaid creditors, such as the drivers, no
practical recourse.

166. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 267 (“[M]ass tort lawyers largely abandoned any
hope that settlement class actions would be the key to finding closure. Nonclass aggregate
settlements have filled this void . . . .”).
167. Id. at 268 (“[C]losure is what defendants demand, and it is what plaintiffs need to offer if
they are to maximize settlement value. The Vioxx Settlement Agreement stands as the most
prominent real-life solution to the intractable problem of achieving closure in a mass tort settlement
without using the class action rule and without resorting to bankruptcy.”).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2012).
169. In general, corporations cannot obtain a discharge absent confirmation of a plan of
reorganization. Id. § 1141(d). A discharge is not, for example, available to a corporation that
liquidates under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 727(a)(1).
170. See Dismissal Order, supra note 5.
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Moreover, CIT and Sun were released from liability in connection
with the LBO—giving them closure. For them, it appears that this was a
central feature of the deal. Yet, the truck drivers had objected, leaving
the question whether they could continue to sue CIT and Sun in New
Jersey state court under New Jersey law after the dismissal. Absent the
“structure” of the dismissal in Jevic—the release given to Sun and
CIT—it appears that they could have. But the deal there sought to take
this away from them. This would have violated the letter of the law
governing non-class aggregate settlements, where each claimant must
signal consent.171 At least so far as the lower courts in Jevic were
concerned, bankruptcy was different. The efficiency demands of Chapter
11 practice—resolving the case—were to the lower courts more
powerful than procedural protections for the drivers.
III. PROCESS VALUES
Although the Jevic majority disagreed with the lower courts, they did
not tell us what constitutes consent in Chapter 11. What, then, to do?
This Part argues that the reasoning and implications of the majority
opinion reflect values of process-quality that courts should consider
proxies for consent. Courts can, in other words, minimize the risk of
false negatives and other consent errors by taking seriously Jevic’s views
about participation, predictability, and procedural integrity.
A.

Participation

To understand Jevic’s process values, consider what was at stake. If
the Court had affirmed the Third Circuit, it is likely that structured
dismissals would increasingly displace plans of reorganization as the
principal mechanism to exit Chapter 11. By reversing, Jevic thus
preserved the role that plans play in reorganization. This, however,
raises a question: what is so great about plans? They can be expensive,
complex, and cumbersome.172 Major stakeholders have for many years
sought to reduce their costs, including through the advent of the

171. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 269 (“Section 3.17(b) of [PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW:
AGGREGATE LITIGATION] presents a legal device designed to allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to bind
clients to a group settlement. Although the proposal would require that clients as a group ratify the
settlement by supermajority vote, it would bypass the requirement of individual
consent. . . . Consent—not closure—determines legitimacy.”).
172. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An
Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J.
141 (2008) (discussing Chapter 11 costs).
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“prepackaged” plan and the rise of all-assets sales under section 363.173
The structured dismissal was, to many, simply the next logical step in
the efficiency-minded evolution of Chapter 11 practice.
While plans can be costly, one of their principal virtues—threatened
by the Jevic structured dismissal—is stakeholder participation. At a high
level of generality, participation is a key characteristic of the U.S. legal
system.174 Among other things, participation through judicial process
promotes the legal “accuracy” of outcomes,175 the dignity of those
aggrieved or accused of wrongdoing,176 and the “legitimacy” of
outcomes.177 Moreover, participation guided by an absolute priority
structure may increase the likelihood of efficiency gains.
Congress designed the Chapter 11 plan process to have two key
participatory features:
Disclosure. Information is a predicate to both participation and
consent. Chapter 11 solves for this by providing that a plan cannot
be confirmed unless it is supported by a “disclosure statement.” A
disclosure statement is a document somewhat like a securities
prospectus, which provides creditors with “adequate information”
173. See, e.g., Stephen H. Case & Mitchell A. Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter
11 Plans of Reorganization and Using the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Instant
Reorganizations, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 75, 83–84 (1992) (“Prepackaged plans have . . . major
advantages over the ‘classic’ chapter 11 process: (i) a fairly high degree of assurance about the
success and brevity of the proceeding; (ii) lower administrative costs . . . .”).
174. “[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the
affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned
arguments for a decision in his favor.” Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 364 (1978).
175. Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 985 (1993)
(“Adversarial presentation by parties’ lawyers enhances the likelihood of reaching a correct
decision.”).
176. Id.
177. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 274 (2004) (noting “a core
right of participation is essential for the legitimacy of adjudication”); Daniel Markovits, Adversary
Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1371–76 (2006) (arguing
legitimacy of government institutions depends on legitimacy with respect to both underlying
“theoretical model,” with “emphasis on abstract propositions about justified political power,” and
“practical approach,” with emphasis on “consequences of actual engagement” and impact of
“participation . . . on the . . . attitudes of the participants”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–52 (1976) (linking the right to participate
personally in adjudication with individuals’ dignity); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving
Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974). But cf. Louis
Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV.
1303, 1362 (2015) (“[P]articipation and other process values may have consequences that are
relevant to social welfare, but they do not systematically relate to the truth or to the often-present
divergence between the pursuit of truth and of consequences in legal system design.”).
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about the plan and the debtor sufficient to enable them to vote for
or against it.178 As a practical matter, the hearing on the motion to
approve the disclosure statement will often channel—and
consensually resolve—objections to the plan itself.
Voting. Short of a state-contingent contract, the best evidence of
participation and consent to resolve a Chapter 11 case will be a
vote. Chapter 11 provides that a plan must have a minimum level of
stakeholder support, generally speaking two-thirds in dollar amount
and more than half in number of creditors entitled to vote.179
Outside of Chapter 11, debt obligations and associated property
rights (e.g., liens) can be modified only if all (or almost all)
creditors so agree.180 In Chapter 11, by contrast, the plan proponent
(presumptively the debtor’s management) places creditors in
classes, and then proposes “treatment” for those classes (e.g.,
payment of a percentage of the claim in cash, issuing new
securities, etc.), which creditors accept or reject by super-majority
vote.181 The logic of Chapter 11 substitutes participation through
the creditor franchise for strict recognition of all pre-bankruptcy
entitlements.
Because structured dismissals involve neither a disclosure statement
nor voting, the structured dismissal approved by the lower courts would
have compromised both. But, the economic pressures that have led to the
advent of structured dismissals are real and often conflict with
participation as a process-value. Thus, the important questions are why
participation is a value in Jevic, and how it should be understood in the
resource-constrained environment of Chapter 11.
1.

Sales v. Plans—Unfinished Chrysler Business?

Participation, like all process values, is not free, and practice under
Chapter 11 has sought to cut these costs through the increased use of all-

178. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012). “Adequate information” is defined as “information of a kind,
and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the
debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records . . . that would enable . . . a hypothetical
investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan.” Id. § 1125(a).
179. Id. § 1126(c). This glosses over much complexity not especially important here, including
that creditors are classified and vote by class. Id. § 1122(a).
180. But cf. Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017)
(permitting modifications under Trust Indenture Act); id. at 11 n.7 (citing Mark J. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. Rev. 661 (1996)).
181. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (requiring plan to “designate, subject to section 1122 of this title,
classes of claims”).
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assets sales. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to do
so outside of a reorganization plan, and this is how many firms in fact
reorganize.182 “In modern bankruptcy practice,” the Third Circuit
recently observed, a sale under section 363 “is the tool of choice to put a
quick close to a bankruptcy case. It avoids time, expense, and, some
would say, the Bankruptcy Code’s unbending rules.”183 Under such a
sale, a debtor may sell all of its assets, as a whole or free from weaker
parts.
The all-assets sale was notoriously the path that the debtors in both In
re Chrysler LLC184 and In re General Motors Corp.185 followed. In
Chrysler, the United States and Canadian governments facilitated
negotiations between Fiat and Chrysler to produce a sale agreement
dated April 30, 2009, the same day that Chrysler filed its Chapter 11
petition.186 Under similar government supervision, General Motors filed
its Chapter 11 petition on June 1 and, on the same day, filed its proposed
sale transaction under section 363.187
The “reorganizations” were effected by selling all assets to purchasers
owned by employees and the government, which had financed the cases.
Creditors of the “old” automakers would still have claims against the
debtors—but they would not receive shares of the purchaser, the future
value of the automakers. To many, this offended horizontal equity.188
182. Id. § 363(b) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”). See generally Brubaker & Tabb, supra
note 16, at 1375 (“Such an internal boot-strap reorganization [has been] on the decline, and many
reorganizations are now accomplished through a relatively expeditious going-concern sale of the
debtor’s business and assets to a third-party purchaser, with a subsequent distribution of the
proceeds to creditors and shareholders in accordance with their relative priority rights.”); Casey,
supra note 13, at 760 (“The norm for today’s corporate reorganization is a quick going-concern
sale.”).
183. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 549 (3d Cir. 2015).
184. 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler
LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (mem.).
185. 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
186. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 111–12.
187. See Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363(b), (f), (k), & (m), & 365 & Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, & 6006, to (I) Approve (A) the Sale Pursuant to the Master Sale & Purchase
Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a U.S. Treasury-sponsored Purchaser, Free &
Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, & Other Interests; (B) The Assumption & Assignment of
Certain Executory Contracts & Unexpired Leases; & (C) Other Relief; & (II) Schedule Sale
Approval Hearing, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026
(REG)), 2009 WL 1529573 [hereinafter GM Debtors’ Motion].
188. Brubaker and Tabb, for example, understandably worry that the automaker cases are “clever
and surreptitious end-runs around chapter 11’s distributional norms.” Brubaker & Tabb, supra note
16, at 1378. Compare Roe & Skeel, supra note 28, at 729 (arguing that the “Chrysler bankruptcy
process used undesirable mechanisms that federal courts and Congress struggled for decades to
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Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Jevic addressed the automaker
cases only in passing, with a “cf.” citation.189 His opinion did, however,
recognize that the logic underlying the automaker cases was
procedurally problematic. “[T]he distributions at issue” in Jevic, he
observed, “more closely resemble proposed transactions that lower
courts have refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the
Code’s procedural safeguards.”190 The “proposed transactions” he had in
mind were all-assets sales that earlier decisions had rejected as disguised
plans under the “sub rosa plan” doctrine.191 A sub rosa plan is a “de
facto plan of reorganization, which enables a debtor to restructure its
debt while bypassing many of the Bankruptcy Code’s fundamental
creditor protections.”192
The sub rosa plan doctrine has been diluted over time because courts
like those in the automaker cases believe that reorganizations can more
efficiently be effectuated by a sale rather than a plan.193 Yet, earlier
decisions—Justice Breyer relied on appellate court opinions from the
early 1980s in the In re Braniff Airways, Inc.194 and In re Lionel Corp.195
bankruptcies—had worried that these sales could threaten the procedural
protections of plans. In Braniff, the Fifth Circuit struck down a proposed
sale of the debtor mid-way through the case that sought (1) to require
suppress”), with Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 531, 532 (2009) (arguing that automaker bankruptcies “are entirely within the
mainstream of chapter 11 practice for the last decade”).
189. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (citing In re
Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118 (“[A]pproving a § 363 asset sale because the bankruptcy court
demonstrated ‘proper solicitude for the priority between creditors and deemed it essential that the
[s]ale in no way upset that priority.’”)).
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting an attempt to “short circuit
the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms
of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets”)); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel
Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing a Bankruptcy Court’s
approval of an asset sale after holding that section 363 does not “grant[] the bankruptcy judge carte
blanche” or “swallow[] up Chapter 11’s safeguards”).
192. Del. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings, LLC (In re Energy Future Holding
Corp.), 527 B.R. 157, 168 (D. Del. 2015) (citing In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 222 B.R. 243, 251
(D. Del. 1998)), aff’d sub nom. In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 648 F. App’x 277 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 447 (2016) (mem.); see also In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at
118.
193. See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118 (“Bankruptcy Judge Gonzalez found good business
reasons for the Sale. The linchpin of his analysis was that the only possible alternative to the Sale
was an immediate liquidation that would yield far less for the estate—and for the objectors.”).
194. 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
195. 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983).
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creditors to vote in favor of any future plan of reorganization supported
by a majority of the official unsecured creditors’ committee; (2) to
release the claims of all parties against the debtor, its secured creditors,
and its officers and directors; and (3) to dictate certain economic terms
of a future plan.196 In Lionel, the Second Circuit did much the same,
under similar circumstances, holding that a sale of a business as a going
concern should occur under a plan, rather than through an earlier sale,
absent emergency circumstances.197
Braniff and Lionel are vintage opinions, predating the rise of routine
all-assets sales. In the past twenty years, courts appear to have become
more comfortable with the expanding domain of reorganization-by-sale.
This entails a shrinking role for plans.198 A sale would, under postBraniff/Lionel precedent, offend the sub rosa plan doctrine only if it “has
the effect of dictating the terms of a prospective chapter 11 plan.”199 To
be found to dictate the terms of a plan, the action “must either (i) dispose
of all claims against the estate or (ii) restrict creditors’ rights to vote.”200
The structured dismissal in Jevic would appear to have flunked either
the old or new versions of the sub rosa plan doctrine. As a practical
matter, its “structure” would have disposed of all claims against the
debtor because, as noted above, it distributed all assets of the debtors
(cash) in the stipulated order of priority. It left behind a judgment-proof
shell. And, because creditors have no vote on a structured dismissal, and
no plan was to follow, it would have “restricted” the right to vote.
Moreover, as in Braniff, the Jevic dismissal sought to eliminate
creditors’ ability to pursue those who may have harmed them or to
negotiate different economic terms in the event a plan was ultimately
proposed. To have approved the structured dismissal in Jevic would
have been to virtually eliminate the last vestiges of the sub rosa plan
doctrine.
196. In re Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d at 940 (“The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be
able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by
establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with the sale of assets. . . . In any future
attempts to specify the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the
district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”).
197. See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1063.
198. See, e.g., In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 116 (approving all-assets sale but noting concerns about
effect on plan-process protections); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009); J. Seth Moore & Vincent P. Slusher, Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales: Trends and
Opportunities, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2007, at 6, 9–10 (observing that “[t]he oversight
and review of a § 363 sale is less than that of a plan confirmation because courts apply the
amorphous and sometimes weak ‘business judgment’ standard to § 363 sales”).
199. In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc., 438 B.R. 471, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
200. Id.
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Jevic did not forbid all-assets sales, however, or even hold that it was
resurrecting the “old” version of the sub rosa plan doctrine. Rather, it
may have been tending to unfinished business from the automaker
bankruptcies. Objecting bondholders in Chrysler went all the way to the
Supreme Court, after losing at every stage, including the Second Circuit.
On a petition for certiorari they technically won: the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case to the Second Circuit, without issuing a
substantive opinion.201 But by then it was a hollow victory, as the sale
was already consummated and the appeal was moot.202
We can infer from Jevic that the majority understood that plans and
their participatory mechanisms have value in the process which should
not be abandoned lightly, even when corporate debtors are sold outside a
plan. The Court’s hurried treatment of Chrysler had left this question
open because the sales there rendered the contours of a plan a fait
accompli. The Jevic majority seems to be saying that even if we believe
all-assets sales maximize value in Chapter 11, we cannot conclude the
process by making final distributions without a plan or, absent a plan,
“consent” or, absent consent, the more rigid absolute priority rule.
Jevic affirmed the participatory demands of plans by making clear
that “consent” is the only exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority
structure in final distributions. Congress carefully and deliberately
developed the procedural protections of plans in order to provide some
assurance of consent to deviations from absolute priority. While consent
outside a plan remains possible, it will for the reasons explained in Part
II be difficult to show in many cases; judges should worry about false
negatives (the absence of objections) as well as strategic dissents (e.g.,
grousing by those clearly out of the money). Plans are hardly perfect
evidence of consent, but they provide a set of guardrails for those
controlling the resolution of a Chapter 11 case. Jevic was the Court’s
way of reminding participants in this process that they cannot drive
through or around those guardrails.

201. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).
202. The Chrysler Court told us virtually nothing about why it was reversing. The full opinion
was a single paragraph:
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Motion of Washington Legal Foundation, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.
Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.
Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. at 1087 (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)).
Citing Munsingwear means that the lower court decisions in Chrysler should have no precedential
effect. A vacatur under Munsingwear “deprive[s] the [lower court’s] opinion of precedential effect.”
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975).
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Participation Through Bargaining and Markets

Plans are not solely procedural mechanisms. In order to be confirmed,
a plan must satisfy a number of substantive criteria that create
opportunities for participation through bargaining and market processes.
The “absolute priority rule” undergirding the Jevic opinion facilitates
both.
The APR developed as a response to perceived abuses in the federal
equity receiverships of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These
cases were the forerunners of the modern Chapter 11 case—and of the
problem in Jevic. The Court in the earlier cases worried that senior
creditors and junior stakeholders (shareholders) would collude to
“squeeze out” the general unsecured creditors.203 In Jevic, the “middle”
stakeholders being squeezed out were the drivers, due to their priority
wage claims.
Although the APR is largely viewed as a distributive principle, it also
has important participatory effects because it can force (or induce) plan
bargaining.204 Plans can be approved consensually, through sufficient
supermajority class voting,205 or non-consensually, if a class dissents.206
203. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd firmly set out the absolute priority rule:
[I]f purposely or unintentionally a single creditor was not paid, or provided for in the
reorganization, [petitioner Boyd] could assert his superior rights against the subordinate
interests of the old stockholders in the property transferred to the new company. They were in
the position of insolvent debtors who could not reserve an interest as against creditors. Their
original contribution to the capital stock was subject to the payment of debts. The property was
a trust fund charged primarily with the payment of corporate liabilities. Any device, whether by
private contract or judicial sale under consent decree, whereby stockholders were preferred
before the creditor, was invalid. Being bound for the debts, the purchase of their property by
their new company for their benefit, put the stockholders in the position of a mortgagor buying
at his own sale. If they did so in good faith and in ignorance of Boyd’s claim, they were none
the less bound to recognize his superior right in the property, when, years later, his contingent
claim was liquidated and established. That such a sale would be void, even in the absence of
fraud in the decree, appears from the reasoning in Louisville Trust Co. . . . .
228 U.S. 482, 504–05 (1913) (citing Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co.,
174 U.S. 674, 683 (1899)).
204. As Douglas Baird puts it:
Whether a group consents depends on its rights under the plan versus the rights it would have if
it refused to go along with the plan. The absolute priority rule is central to the law of corporate
reorganizations because it is the source of substantive rights as well as the procedural
protections that each participant in a reorganization enjoys. Parties can insist that the priority
rights they enjoyed outside of bankruptcy be respected inside. Nevertheless, every junior party,
including the shareholders, can invoke elaborate procedures before their rights are
compromised. The absolute priority rule allows the senior parties to insist on full payment, but
it also grants all junior parties those procedural protections necessary for a “just
reorganization.” Resolving this tension between substantive and procedural rights that began
with Boyd remains central to answering the hard questions that arise under Chapter 11.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 86 (4th ed. 2006). See generally id. at 225–
82.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012).
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In the event of dissent, section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
requires a court to impose absolute priority because it may only approve
the plan if it does not “discriminate unfairly” and is “fair and
equitable.”207 “Fair and equitable” means that if a class of unsecured
creditors dissents, the plan may be confirmed if the dissenters are paid in
full, or junior claimants’ rights (e.g., shareholdings) are eliminated.208
Shareholders might, given this threat, walk away. But if they believe
there is a brighter future for the debtor, they might not. Rather than lose
their stake, junior claimants (equity) may protect their interest under the
so-called “new value corollary.”209 A “new value” plan may be approved
over a dissenting class vote, and junior stakeholders may retain an
interest in the debtor, if they provide “new value” commensurate with
the stake they retain. That is, if they “make a fresh contribution [they
may] receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their
contribution.”210
The “new value” corollary may sound like a cockeyed bargain: why
should creditors care if shareholders are wiped out? But it has the effect
of forcing those most likely in historic control of the debtor
(shareholders) either to propose a plan that in fact induces widespread
support or to give up their junior stake. Chapter 11 practice sees this as a
206. Id. § 1129(b).
207. Id. Section 1129(b)(1) prohibits “unfair discrimination,” which “assures fair treatment
among classes of the same priority level.” See In re SunEdison, Inc., 575 B.R. 220, 226 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2017).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (permitting cramdown where “the holder of any claim or
interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account
of such junior claim or interest any property”). See generally Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Assoc.
v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 441–42 (1999).
209. Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118 (1939), suggested that the objection of
an impaired senior class does not bar junior claim holders from receiving or retaining property
interests in the debtor after reorganization, if they contribute new capital in money or money’s
worth, reasonably equivalent to the property’s value, and necessary for successful reorganization of
the restructured enterprise.
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockholders may participate in a
plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor. . . . Where th[e] necessity [for new capital] exists
and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return a participation
reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made. . . . [W]e believe that to
accord “the creditor his full right of priority against the corporate assets” where the debtor is
insolvent, the stockholder’s participation must be based on a contribution in money or in
money’s worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of
the stockholder.
Id. at 121–22. It is worth noting that the Court has never affirmatively held that the new value
corollary does (or does not) exist. See LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 443 (“We do not decide whether the
statute includes a new value corollary or exception, but hold that on any reading respondent’s
proposed plan fails to satisfy the statute, and accordingly reverse.”).
210. Case, 308 U.S. at 121.
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bargaining opportunity: precisely because there may be (residual) going
concern value that shareholders wish to preserve, they are likely to
negotiate a plan attractive enough to unsecured creditors to obtain
affirmative support sufficient to avoid cramdown.
But all of this glosses over difficult practical questions, in particular
how much should the shareholders pay, and how do we figure that out?
Consistent with Jevic, the Court has chosen a priority-enforcing rule that
has important participatory implications, through the use of markets,
which, in theory, reduce risks of seriously erroneous judicial valuations.
In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership,211 the Court’s last major foray into Chapter
11 jurisprudence before Jevic, Justice Souter held that valuation for
these purposes must include market exposure—and not (only) judicial
valuation.212 Justice Souter’s opinion there noted that when Congress
drafted the current Bankruptcy Code, it deliberately reduced the role of
judges in making valuation determinations in order to induce greater
market participation.213 There are alternatives to market-derived
valuations, such as expert testimony, which can inform how much a
judge thinks junior stakeholders should pay. Yet, there is a strongly held
view that market exposure tends to be a superior institutional choice
because it promises broader participation.214 As conceived by LaSalle,
the new value corollary would also tend to induce bargaining amongst
the parties: if shareholders did not like the prospect of market
competition, they would have to pony up enough to obtain creditors’
consent, through an affirmative plan vote.215

211. 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
212. Id. at 454 (the plan in LaSalle was “doomed . . . by its provision for vesting equity in the
reorganized business in the Debtor’s partners without extending an opportunity to anyone else either
to compete for that equity or to propose a competing reorganization plan”).
213. Id. at 457 (“[O]ne of the Code’s innovations [was] to narrow the occasions for courts to
make valuation judgments, as shown by its preference for the supramajoritarian [sic] class creditor
voting scheme in § 1126(c) . . . .” (citation omitted)).
214. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 221 n.4 (4th ed. 1992) (“It is the
superiority of the market to the courts in determining subjective values that provides the major
reason for the law’s seeking to channel resource allocation through the market wherever possible.”).
215. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458 n.28 (“Congress adopted the view that creditors and equity security
holders are very often better judges of the debtor’s economic viability and their own economic selfinterest than courts, trustees, or the SEC . . . . Consistent with this new approach, the Chapter 11
process relies on creditors and equity holders to engage in negotiations toward resolution of their
interests.” (quoting G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Mike Sigal & William H. Schorling, Review of the
Proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies:
Part One, 53 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1406 n.136 (1998))).
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All of these forms of participation—through the vote, the market, and
the negotiated deal—were threatened by the structured dismissal in
Jevic, because there would be no need or place for plans in a world
where priority-skipping dismissals were permissible over objection.
3.

Participation Through Committees

Bargaining is relatively easy in small groups. It becomes more
difficult as the number of participants grows. As noted, large and
medium-sized Chapter 11 cases can involve hundreds or thousands of
stakeholders. This impedes direct bargaining, and instead requires
representative participation, through “committees.”
Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “the United States
trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured
claims . . . . ordinarily consist[ing] of the persons, willing to serve, that
hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented
on such committee . . . .”216 “The concept of a creditors’ committee has
great appeal,” Harner and Marincic observe.217 “It signifies
representation and cooperation—key elements of most successful debt
restructuring plans” because it “presents a potential solution to the
collective action problem that often impairs debt restructuring
efforts.”218
But committees are imperfect representatives. They have no statutory
mandate to bind unsecured creditors for most purposes.219 While they
have standing to object to important matters in a case,220 there is no
guarantee that they speak for all or even many creditors. In theory, the
committee is supposed to represent creditors holding “representative”

216. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)–(b) (2012).
217. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the
Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 756 (2011).
218. Id. Courts have the discretion to appoint additional committees of junior stakeholders, such
as shareholders or creditors holding special types of claims (e.g., tort claims if the debtor is a mass
tortfeasor). 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); In re Spansion, Inc., 421 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009);
In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
219. Bussel & Klee, supra note 15, at 688 (“[T]he phenomenon of official creditors’ committees
serving as proxies for unsecured creditors has developed entirely outside the statute itself and
reinforces the power of self-pronounced ‘major parties.’ The statutory powers and duties of
committees nowhere suggest that committee consent may bind its constituency; their statutory role
is to investigate on behalf of, and to inform and advise constituents, not consent for them.” (citations
omitted)).
220. For example, the committee in Jevic could have objected to the structured dismissal there.
Statutory committees have standing to support or oppose Rule 9019 settlement motions. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1109(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018.
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claims, which is a bit of a tautology.221 In Jevic, the petitioning truck
drivers held both priority wage claims and general unsecured claims. 222
From a distributive perspective, committee members holding priority
claims may have different incentives and risk-preferences than those
who don’t. Moreover, in many small and medium-sized cases,
committees may not be appointed at all.223
As noted above,224 the ALI Principles indicate that representative
consent may be acceptable where the representatives satisfy certain
ethical criteria. While it is not clear whether, or to what extent, Chapter
11 practice may include those or similar mechanisms, Jevic will likely
heighten sensitivity to conflicts and underrepresentation that can impair
participation in the reorganization process. Jevic can thus be seen as an
invitation—or warning—to those who would participate on or represent
(as counsel) creditors’ committees to take more seriously their obligation
to ascertain and advocate the interests of all they purport to represent, or
to find ethical ways to address underlying conflicts. Chapter 11’s
committee structure was designed to promote this sort of participation,
even as developments in Chapter 11 practice may have made it more
challenging.
4.

The Price and Promise of Participation—Final Distributions

Although Jevic affirms the role of stakeholder participation in
Chapter 11 cases, there should be no illusions about its costs:
participation in reorganization is a double-edged sword. It might sound
good to say that stakeholders should participate in reorganization,
through plans or consent. Yet, the response may be that there is already
too much participation, and that the structured dismissal arose as a way
to contain participation’s excessive costs. Some sophisticated
creditors—especially distress investors fighting over the valuation of the
debtor with senior creditors—participate actively. Many worry that this

221. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). The statute merely requires that it “shall ordinarily consist of the
persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds
represented on such committee.” Id.
222. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 981 (2017).
223. Because creditors may be unwilling to serve, in most Chapter 11 cases no committee is
appointed. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1102.02[1][a] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2018); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983); Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 247, 250 (1983).
224. See supra section II.A.3.
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participation can be a costly sideshow of little benefit to reorganizing
debtors or their larger constituencies.225
This, then, raises the question: why does participation matter in
bankruptcy? Resolving corporate financial distress need not be
participatory, and is not always so. For example, the bank failure regime
in the United States is decidedly non-participatory.226 When banks fail,
they cannot use the Chapter 11 system.227 Instead, they are seized
without warning by their regulators and are liquidated or sold in short
order.228 Creditors of the bank—in particular, individual depositors—do
not participate in the process because participation in that context would
likely be disastrous: bank runs, not workout negotiations, would
ensue.229 But these sorts of panics are generally limited to banks, whose
depositors—an important class of creditors—have little ability to
coordinate amongst themselves or to negotiate with the bank.
Chapter 11 is different because the expectation is that corporate
stakeholders can or should be able to fend for themselves more
effectively than retail bank depositors.230 This expectation reflects what
may be a fairly efficient division of labor. The logic is that those in
control of the debtor (presumptively managers, but also senior creditors,
to an important extent) would have greater insight into how to maximize
the value of assets than would stakeholders at large. Corporate debtors
will often be managed in reorganization by “turnaround managers,” who
have (or should have) expertise in value-maximization. While there are
concerns about the influence that these managers can wield, there is little

225. Compare Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609
(2009), with Jared A. Ellias, The Shadowy Contours of Bankruptcy Resistant Investments, 114
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 123 (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638901 [https://perma.cc/LYL3MZZM]. See also Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwarter, Inc. (In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc.), 836 F.2d 1263,
1266 (10th Cir. 1988) (expressing concern about situations where “a creditor may sit idly by, not
participate in any manner in the formulation and adoption of a [Chapter 11 plan] and thereafter,
subsequent to the adoption of the plan, raise a challenge to the plan for the first time”).
226. Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of
Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673 (2015).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (defining who may be a debtor so as to exclude banks).
228. See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 226, at 709 (“Under federal banking law, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or other designated regulator may seize a bank that is ‘critically
undercapitalized,’ a minimum of two percent equity capital to total assets.”).
229. Id. at 711 (discussing participatory problems with bank failure regime, and observing that
“[w]hile courts certainly could supervise bank failures—and do so in many nations—there are
sound institutional reasons for leaving that choice with government”).
230. There are, of course, other institutional reasons for the difference in treatment as well,
including that banks are thought to perform a special function in the economy. Id.

05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

678

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/6/2018 9:21 PM

[Vol. 93:631

doubt that they would know more about how to make the most of a
debtor’s assets than would general unsecured creditors.
The same cannot be said for final distributions. Insiders will not have
greater expertise about how the consideration received in the sale should
be distributed to the debtor’s full body of stakeholders. Indeed, selfinterest would make it hard for those insiders to maximize distributions
to others, even as it may spur them to maximize asset value.
Participation by all stakeholders in that latter decision—through a plan
or consent to a structured dismissal or absolute priority—would seem to
be the best way to prevent the expropriation likely to occur when a small
group of insiders gets to decide what a large group of outsiders receives.
The structured dismissal approved by the lower courts in Jevic would
have impaired this division of participatory labor by vesting in insiders
the power to control both pre-plan sales (asset-value maximization) and
final distributions. It would have neutralized the last vestige of creditor
participation in the reorganization process over the things that,
functionally, matter the most to them: how they actually get paid (if at
all).
B.

Predictability and Procedural Integrity

While participation may be the most complex and important process
value that Jevic advances, the majority opinion was also motivated by
concerns about predictability and procedural integrity. To take these
concerns seriously is to see that they also advance goals of responsible
participation needed to induce consent.
1.

Predictability

Predictability is at once an obvious process value in our legal system
and yet especially challenging in the “unruly”231 world of corporate
reorganization. It is a core goal of our legal system—the premise and
perhaps the product of stare decisis in common law adjudication.232 As
231. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012) (noting
the importance of clarity and predictability in light of the fact that the “Bankruptcy Code
standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”).
232. Stare decisis derives from the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means “to
abide by the precedents and not to disturb settled points.” 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.01[1] (3d ed. 2017). Stare decisis is settled precedent that “reaches its
apogee when a single precedent is considered to be a ‘binding’ authority.” Marla Brooke Tusk, NoCitation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1206 (2003)
(quoting Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 29 (1959)).
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Michael Van Alstine recently observed, “[v]ertical stare
decisis . . . serves the core values of system stability and predictability,
for it is by this means that the precedents of superior courts have
practical effect through mandatory adherence by inferior courts
throughout the system.”233 Like other courts, bankruptcy courts express a
strong appreciation for the virtues of stare decisis234 and the
predictability that that principle provides.235
The majority opinion in Jevic promoted predictability in two ways.
First, being a static structure, the absolute priority rule likely reduces
resolution costs in large and medium-sized bankruptcy cases. For many
observers, the rigidity of the APR promotes ex ante investment because
creditors know, beforehand, where they will stand in relation to one
another (and the debtor’s shareholders) if the debtor fails.236 This is
plausible. But, it also has ex post efficiency benefits, precisely because it
is a simpler framework in which to bargain to the endgame after
default.237 This has a strong intuitive appeal, because a more narrowly
tailored range of potential outcomes should usually make it easier to
bargain.
Good lawyers—especially those who work in an environment like
Chapter 11, where bargaining is a key form of participation—understand
that expectations about final period play influence that which comes

233. Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 963 (2012).
234. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Judge Gerber
said the following:
This Court follows the decisions of its fellow bankruptcy judges in this district, in the absence
of plain error, because the interests of predictability in commercial bankruptcy cases are of
such great importance. Apart from the underlying reasons that have caused stare decisis to be
embedded in American decisional law, stare decisis is particularly important in commercial
bankruptcy cases because of the expense and trauma of any commercial bankruptcy, and the
need to deal with foreseeable events, by pre-bankruptcy planning, to the extent they can be
addressed.
Id.
235. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 72 n.13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“This Court has been on record for many years as having held that the interests of predictability in
this District are of great importance . . . .”).
236. Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1236 (“The absolute priority rule provides the fixed
framework within which the players negotiate the plan of reorganization and within which the judge
evaluates it.”); see also Adler, supra note 12, at 214 (“Anticipation of breaches in absolute priority
can raise a firm’s ex ante cost of capital.”).
237. Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1279 (observing that in some cases under the APR, “the
resulting transactional, doctrinal, and legislative structures are more efficient and fair than what they
replace”); see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009) (noting intercreditor conflict is common and
“distorts outcomes in bankruptcy cases”).
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before.238 It is, for example, well understood that the “shadow” cast by
different resolution standards affects the bargaining over whether to
settle or try a case.239 At least as a general proposition, the greater the
uncertainty, the greater the likelihood of protracted litigation.240
So, too, in corporate reorganization. While adjudication of a “nonconsensual” plan is not a trial in a traditional sense,241 the shadow cast
by the rules that govern final distributions absent consent to an
alternative will necessarily affect the participation that occurs before the
final distributions are made. If parties understand that the endgame will
be either consent or absolute priority, they will bargain in one way. If,
instead, they know that the endgame permits priority (and perhaps other)
deviations via structured dismissals that are unpredictable ex ante, they
will bargain differently. Although reasonable minds might differ about
this, it would appear that uncertainty increases the risks of strategic
litigation and expropriation. Because absolute priority is axiomatically
more certain than relative priority, it would appear to be a less costly
default rule.
Second, the Jevic majority appears to have been skeptical that the
deviation approved by the courts below could be limited to “rare” cases

238. In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 546 B.R. 348, 358 (Bankr. E.D. Va.) (“The [management
retention plan] ensures that the Debtors maintain a keen focus on the Chapter 11 end-game, by
making a significant part of the bonus pool contingent on confirmation of a plan of
reorganization.”), aff’d sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Plan & Tr. v. Alpha
Nat. Res., Inc., 553 B.R. 556 (E.D. Va. 2016); Ingrid C. Palermo, The Changing Face of
Bankruptcy Law, 2014 WL 788389, at *4 (“If you file for Chapter 11 but do not have an end-game
strategy, you are doomed to fail.”).
239. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to
No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
320 (1991); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection
Hypothesis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985).
240. This is most commonly captured in the view that trials in traditional litigation represent
predictive errors. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1074 (1989) (trials result from “mistaken
prediction[s]” made by parties). See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 239, at 16 (suggesting that
“more uncertainty as to . . . outcomes” produces “more disagreement between the parties”). Cf.
Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 275
(1995) (arguing that the uncertainty of incomplete entitlements can lead to efficient bargaining
outcomes).
241. But there will be a “trial” in a functional sense. See, e.g., In re Tex. Rangers Baseball
Partners, No. 10-43400 (DML), 2010 WL 4106713, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2010)
(observing that plan is confirmed under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made
applicable by Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9014, governing “contested matters”).
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because Jevic, itself, was not a rare case. The Third Circuit majority had
reasoned that priority-skipping final distributions may be approved “in a
rare case,”242 if the bankruptcy court has “specific and credible grounds
to justify [the] deviation.”243 The Court rejected this, noting that it was
“difficult to give precise content to the concept ‘sufficient reasons’” to
justify a priority deviation at the end of a case.244 “That fact,” the
majority observed, “threatens to turn a ‘rare case’ exception into a more
general rule.”245
The Court rejected the claim that there could be no resolution without
skipping the drivers’ claims, or even that the distributions approved by
the lower courts “would make some creditors (high- and low-priority
creditors) better off without making other (mid-priority) creditors worse
off (for they would receive nothing regardless).”246 If there was, in fact,
nothing rare about this case, the majority reasoned, “one can readily
imagine other cases that turn on comparably dubious predictions. The
result is uncertainty. And uncertainty will lead to similar claims being
made in many, not just a few, cases.”247 Practice under Chapter 11 is
replete with stories of ostensibly “rare” departures from a statutory
standard becoming the norm.248 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
was right to worry about the slippery slope of Jevic’s structured
dismissal.
Yet, predictability can be problematic in bankruptcy for a variety of
reasons. The resource constraints that lead to bankruptcy do not vanish
once a company commences a case, even as it may temporarily be
242. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
243. Id. at 184 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium
Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007)) (alteration in original). Judge Scirica’s dissent
in the opinion below was also appropriately skeptical.
It is not unusual for a debtor to enter bankruptcy with liens on all assets, nor is it unusual for a
debtor to enter Chapter 11 proceedings . . . with the goal of liquidating . . . . It is also not
difficult to imagine another secured creditor who wants to avoid providing funds to priority
unsecured creditors . . . .
Id. at 189–90 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
244. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
245. Id.
246. Id. (observing that “the record provides equivocal support” for the lower courts’ predictions
about resolution absent the structured dismissal approved below).
247. Id. (“[O]nce the floodgates are opened, debtors and favored creditors can be expected to
make every case that ‘rare case.’” (quoting Frederick F. Rudzik, A Priority Is a Priority Is a
Priority—Except When It Isn’t, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2015, at 16, 79)).
248. As discussed in section IV.B, infra, “superpriority” debtor in possession financing was
meant to be rare but is now commonplace.
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protected from collection litigation. Congress made Chapter 11 flexible
to give parties and judges leeway to craft and recognize creative,
negotiated resolutions.249 Flexibility entails discretion, which, in turn,
permits (and perhaps promotes) uncertainty. While the Court has sought
to cabin the discretion of bankruptcy judges,250 Chapter 11 gives them
significant powers over the corporate debtors that appear before them.
Observers worry that this discretion may contribute to capture of the
bankruptcy bench by the bankruptcy bar. Lynn LoPucki, for example,
has argued that the bankruptcy bench and bar in Delaware and New
York have been corrupted by the desire to run big Chapter 11 cases in
those venues.251 Although the structured dismissal is not limited to use
there, Jevic did come out of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware, which is the nation’s busiest Chapter 11 court. That court
appears to have been highly receptive to innovations like structured
dismissals that may seem appropriate in a given case, but that can over
time expand to tolerate normative outcomes that defy both the will of
Congress and the participatory goals of Chapter 11.
2.

Procedural Integrity

Concerns about the unruly nature of bankruptcy courts also inform the
Court’s views in Jevic about integrity in the Chapter 11 process,
generally. Integrity has special resonance for bankruptcy practice, which
has at times been caricatured as little more than a “ring” of parasites
gnawing away at the carcass of the failed debtor.252
Today, notwithstanding provocative claims to the contrary, there is
little direct evidence of that sort of collusion. Instead, dominant parties
in Chapter 11 cases may enter into agreements, like the structured
dismissal in Jevic. Such agreements have the potential to defy
mandatory and well-justified rules, including those on absolute priority,

249. See Lipson, supra note 225, at 1654 (observing that designed Chapter 11 bankruptcy “to be
highly flexible, to permit the reorganization of small, local firms as well as very large public
companies”).
250. See Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (2014) (“The Code’s meticulous—not
to say mind-numbingly detailed—enumeration of exemptions and exceptions to those exemptions
confirms that courts are not authorized to create additional exceptions.”).
251. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
252. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 6011 (1977) (describing the “unseemly and continuing
relationship” under pre-Code practice among bar and judges as a “bankruptcy ring”); Laura Napoli
Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381, 439 (2015).
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designed to protect those who, for whatever reasons, do not participate
in the deal.253
For the Jevic majority, sustaining the courts (and the deal) below
risked promoting this sort of soft collusion in three ways. First, as the
Court observed, approving this structured dismissal would invite junior
and senior creditors to join forces in order to squeeze out those in the
middle, as would have happened to the drivers in Jevic.254 This was, in
form, the problem in the equity receiverships that both led to the
formulation of the APR and to Congress’s basic approach to
reorganization under Chapter 11. The guardrails of the plan process were
designed, among other things, to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of
the receiverships.
Second, the structured dismissal would have released CIT and Sun
from liability in connection with the LBO.255 This would have created
even greater problems. Recall that they had been significantly
responsible for the LBO, had presumably benefited from it, and were
now seeking to use the structured dismissal to limit liability for the harm
it allegedly caused. It would have been one thing had the drivers agreed
to the settlement and release contained in the structured dismissal; then,
Sun and CIT could legitimately say that the structured dismissal simply
purchased peace for a price acceptable to all involved. But the drivers
objected, and the bankruptcy court approved the release anyway. Even
this may not have been problematic, if the drivers had been permitted to
sue Sun and CIT in state court after the dismissal, given that state law
apparently created a cause of action under New Jersey’s fraudulent
transfer law. Instead, the dismissal took the extraordinary step of
effectively barring the drivers from suing Sun and CIT outside
bankruptcy court.256
Although the Jevic majority did not focus on this, it is hard to
overstate the danger the release created. Fraudulent transfer law may be
one of the last checks on excessive lending in the acquisition context. It
253. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444
(1999) (discussing how the absolute priority rule was developed in response to “concern with ‘the
ability of a few insiders, whether representatives of management or major creditors, to use the
reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage’” (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 255
(1973))).
254. Structured dismissals like those in Jevic present “risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured
creditors and general unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority unsecured creditors.”
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017) (citing LaSalle, 526
U.S. at 444).
255. See discussion supra note 46.
256. See discussion supra note 46.
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says to investors such as Sun and lenders such as CIT that if an
acquisition is too leveraged, and that leverage harms the debtor and its
other creditors, they—the parties that struck and benefited from the
deal—will be liable to the creditors harmed by it. If, instead, the Suns
and CITs of the world know that they can use a structured dismissal to
escape liability for deals that harm other stakeholders, they will have less
reason to exercise restraint in those deals. It would invite collusion ex
ante between the leveraged acquirers and sellers of businesses, who
would know that they could easily disable an important deterrent to such
deals through a structured dismissal.
Third, Jevic recognizes that integrity requires respect for cost, and in
particular the cost of bargaining to a consensual resolution.257 As noted
above, the uncertainty introduced by deviations from the absolute
priority rule, and the “rare case” exception crafted by the lower courts,
would have invited more litigation to clarify—or exploit—this
uncertainty. This would have driven up the cost of resolving Chapter 11
cases after Jevic. While some distress professionals may benefit from
such a state of affairs, those for whom the system exists would not.
C.

Jevic’s Assumption—Equity in the Estate

Jevic’s procedural logic turns on a crucial assumption: that there is
equity in the estate sufficient to fund a case and produce some return to
stakeholders other than senior secured creditors; that is, that there are
stakeholders who are “in the money.” Here, the drivers were in the
money because the proceeds of the fraudulent transfer suit were property
of the estate, and they were next in line to receive them, but for the
structured dismissal.
But this will not always be the case. Practitioners view the structured
dismissal as especially appropriate where the debtor’s assets have been
sold, leaving it with “no unsecured assets to administer or with
insufficient unsecured assets to fund a confirmable plan.”258 It would not
be difficult to apply absolute priority where a debtor has fully
encumbered its assets: the senior secured creditor would take everything.
That, then, begs a question: why bother with Chapter 11 reorganization
and Jevic’s process values at all? What work does Jevic really do if, as
257. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (“And they include making settlement more difficult to achieve.”
(citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271 (1976))).
258. Pernick & Dean, supra note 29, at 1, 58–59; see also In re Petersburg Regency LLC, 540
B.R. 508, 531 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (approving structured dismissal over equity holders’ objection
on grounds that there was no equity in assets).
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explained in the next part, debtors fully encumber their assets prior to
bankruptcy, such that it may be impossible to pay mid-priority or junior
claimants under “ordinary” priority?
IV. THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY: PRIORITY AS PROCESS
The answer, perhaps counterintuitive, is that Jevic’s process values—
participation, predictability, and procedural integrity—provide a basis
for resisting the power that senior secured creditors seem often to
exercise in reorganization.
Priority lives a dual life. It is a substantive doctrine about the
distribution of property, but it also has strong procedural effects.259
Because senior creditors frequently do not actually want immediate
liquidation shares of the property in which they have priority (because
the value would be depressed), they have instead learned to use their
leverage to obtain procedural power over the reorganization of distressed
companies—that is, to fight for future value. Jevic’s logic demands an
assessment of the procedural power that senior creditors have accrued
and boundaries to manage that power.
A.

Priority as Process

To some extent, senior creditors have long enjoyed procedural
advantages over junior stakeholders. Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, for example, permits secured creditors to use selfhelp to take personal property securing their loan, provided that they can
do so without “breach of the peace.”260 Mortgagees use judicial
processes to realize on their priority interest in real property over other
competing claimants, such as unsecured creditors who may seek to
establish judgment liens on the property.

259. Jay Westbrook was among the first to identify the distinct relationship between priority and
process. See Westbrook, supra note 16, at 797 (arguing that “control of the bankruptcy process,
rather than formal rules of security and priority, is the key to understanding both secured-credit and
bankruptcy law: Control is the function of bankruptcy; priority is the end for which it is employed”).
I recognize that this assumes a somewhat artificial distinction between “substantive” and
“procedural” rules. Whether this distinction exists in the abstract is a question of jurisprudence
beyond the scope of this paper.
260. U.C.C. § 9-609 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Of course, situations
involving multiple layers of secured creditors present much more interesting and challenging
situations than may concern us here. See, e.g., Frierson v. United Farm Agency, 868 F.2d 302, 305
(8th Cir. 1989) (junior creditor who garnishes collateral takes subject to senior creditor’s security
interest).
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Indeed, senior creditors had so much power outside bankruptcy that
Chapter 11 was conceived in important part as a way to level the playing
field as among senior creditors, a debtor, and its junior stakeholders.261
“The Chapter 11 process,” legislative history observed, “involves a
system of checks and balances designed to protect and promote the
interests of all the affected parties.”262
In the past twenty-five years, however, senior secured credit has
exploded as a financing tool,263 and senior creditors have learned how to
use the power of their priority to usurp control of the process. Many
observers worry that the growing power of senior creditors is the single
greatest challenge to the efficiency and integrity of Chapter 11.264 An
261. As legislative history explains:
[R]eorganization, in its fundamental aspects, involves the thankless task of determining who
should share the losses incurred by an unsuccessful business and how the values of the estate
should be apportioned among creditors and stockholders. In a large public company, whose
interests are diverse and complex, the most vulnerable today are public investors who own
subordinated debt or equity securities. The bill, like Chapter X, is designed to counteract the
natural tendency of a debtor in distress to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would
expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public investors.
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796; see also Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Creditor Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical View, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 831, 833 (“Traditionally, the various institutions of modern Chapter 11 bankruptcy
produced a certain balance among the debtor and various creditor constituencies.”).
262. A Bill to Amend Title 11, United States Code, The Bankruptcy Code, Regarding Benefits of
Certain Retired Employees: Hearing on S. 548 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 154 (1987) (statement of Richard A. Gitlin,
President, American Bankruptcy Institute).
263. As long ago as 1994, Robert Scott observed:
[A]sset-based [i.e., secured] financing has undergone an enormous transformation since the
enactment of Article 9. The most vivid illustration of this is the dramatic increase in the
number and size of firms that rely on secured credit as their principal means of financing both
ongoing operations and growth opportunities. Previously, with a few exceptions (such as
factoring and trust receipts), secured financing principally had served second-class markets as
the “poor man’s” means of obtaining credit. Now, it has become the linchpin of private
financing, prompting even large firms to employ leveraged buyouts as a means of fleeing
public equity markets for the safe harbors of Article 9. When viewed in these terms, Article 9
can only be seen as a blazing success.
Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1784–85 (1994). The rise of secured
credit was significantly facilitated by the enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which was, in turn, importantly shaped by both scholars, such as Grant Gilmore, and scholarpractitioners, such as Homer Kripke, who for much of his career was, coincidentally, with CIT.
Grant Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 9, 11 (1981). Kripke,
like most advocates of that law, viewed it as means to advance distributive—not procedural—goals.
“[T]he legal structure of secured credit developed to make possible mass production and the
distribution of goods” which, he argued, “have increased human welfare.” Homer Kripke, Law and
Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 929, 931 n.14 (1985).
264. Westbrook, supra note 261, at 833 (“Secured creditors have by far the most effective tools
for upsetting that balance and obtaining control of Chapter 11 cases, converting the Debtor in
Possession (‘DIP’) to a Secured Party in Possession.”); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
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extensive report by the American Bankruptcy Institute recently warned
that senior creditors use their priority rights to “increase their control
over borrower cash and ultimately over a Chapter 11 filing.”265 Professor
Tabb puts the point bluntly: “the entire reorganization is dependent on
the good graces of the pre-bankruptcy controlling secured lender.”266
Although Jevic involved priority, it was not directly about the power
of senior creditors. Rather, it was about the status of mid-priority
creditors, squeezed by the senior creditors and junior shareholders. But,
as explained below, Jevic’s senior creditor, CIT, got to control the
process from the beginning through terms approved by the bankruptcy
court in a “super-priority” case-financing agreement. Senior creditors
such as CIT use these agreements to control or strongly influence most
of the succeeding decisions in the case, including whether, when, and
how to sell assets.
Structured dismissals may be especially attractive to senior creditors
because they would provide control at the final stage—distributions. In
other words, even before Jevic, senior creditors have often been able to
control the beginning and middle of cases. But they could not control the
end. The structured dismissal approved by the lower courts would have

Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2002) (describing a
fundamental shift in Chapter 11 bankruptcy from a reorganization vehicle to a means of liquidation
driven in large part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current
assets as greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future); Brubaker & Tabb, supra
note 16, at 104–05 (writing that fundamental changes in the financial world, including the growing
power of secured creditors, have brought an end to traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations); Harvey
R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 131 (2005) (writing
that creditors increasingly use bankruptcy to effectuate favorable asset sales with no attempt at
reorganization); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 919–20 (2003) (discussing a shift to increasing secured
creditor control in Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a result of the debtor in possession financing provisions
in section 364, which skew any incentive the DIP lender otherwise had in the creditor’s
reorganization); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 12 (expressing concern about secured creditor control of the Chapter 11
process); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 843–44 (describing the rise within Chapter 11 bankruptcy of
the secured-party-in-possession: secured parties which are able to assert their Article 9 rights to
payment, security, and control within the bankruptcy proceeding).
265. ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 215 n.784 (quoting ASM Field Hearing Before the ABI
Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, at 1–2 (Apr. 19, 2013) (statement of John Haggerty)).
266. Tabb, supra note 30, at 768. The idea that senior creditors can assert control rights is not,
itself, new. George Triantis was the first to discuss control rights and the way in which they inhere
in debt instruments. See George G. Triantis, Debt Financing, Corporate Decision Making, and
Security Design, 26 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 93, 100–02 (1996); George G. Triantis, The Interplay
Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and
Guillotines, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 101, 104–08 (1996). What is new, as explained below, is the
extent to which senior creditors can use priority to capture control of the process, itself.
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changed that. Vesting this much power in any single stakeholder in a
Chapter 11 case would have magnified risks of expropriation and error.
B.

Case Financing—“Super Priority” DIP Lending

Because the goal of Chapter 11 is the reorganization of troubled but
viable going concerns, Congress recognized that operating debtors
would need to use revenues from sales after commencement of the case.
This might be a problem if a secured creditor’s lien extended to revenues
earned after commencement of the case. However, the Bankruptcy Code
makes clear that property acquired by a debtor post-petition is generally
free from prepetition security interests.267 Post-petition earnings could,
in theory, finance the case itself as well as the restructuring of the
business and, ultimately, the Chapter 11 reorganization plan that would
embody the “new deal” among the debtor and its stakeholders.
In many Chapter 11 cases, however, a debtor’s revenues are
inadequate to fund operations. The debtor will need post-petition debtorin-possession (DIP) financing to remain in business throughout the
bankruptcy.268 Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code governs these
transactions. If a debtor cannot obtain post-petition financing on an
unsecured or administrative priority basis, “section 364(c) . . . permits a
debtor to provide . . . a claim with a . . . superpriority.”269 This superpriority places the holder ahead of all other priority claims.270
Super-priority lending requires a showing of serious need by the
debtor and procedural protections for junior claimants.271 It was meant to
267. For example, Bankruptcy Code section 552 limits the effectiveness of a secured creditor’s
security interest in property a debtor acquires after it commences its case to “proceeds, products”
and so on of prepetition collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). In theory, property the DIP acquires
post-petition that is not, itself, proceeds of prepetition collateral is available for the estate’s use,
unencumbered. Congress observed that this approach was “designed, among other things, to prevent
windfalls for secured creditors and to give the courts broad discretion to balance the protection of
secured creditors, on the one hand, against the strong public policies favoring continuation of jobs,
preservation of going concern values and rehabilitation of distressed debtors, generally.” 140 CONG.
REC. H10, 768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994); see also United Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab
Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1986).
268. Nicole Stephansen, Roll-Up Financing Gains Prominence, RESTRUCTURING REV., June
2010, at 10, http://documents.lexology.com/2f2d4fb8-6839-49fd-a592-c8710bfab9a3.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LY32-CMA5].
269. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 364(c).
270. See Stephansen, supra note 268, at 10.
271. In re Levitt & Sons, LLC, 384 B.R. 630, 640–41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (“In the event the
debtor is unable to obtain credit under the provisions of § 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor
may obtain credit secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is already subject to
a lien, commonly called a ‘priming lien.’”). “Such relief may be granted so long as (1) the debtor is
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be the exception rather than the rule, a last-resort financing. That,
however, is not how Chapter 11 practice has developed. Super-priority
DIP financing is now common, even in cases that are clearly not
intended to be reorganizations, but instead merely controlled
liquidations, such as Jevic.
Complicating matters is the fact that in some cases, the prebankruptcy
senior lender will provide the post-petition DIP financing, and will ask
that its prepetition claim be “rolled up” into the DIP loan.272 This has the
practical effect of “converting the DIP lender’s (likely) undersecured
pre-bankruptcy loan into a fully secured postpetition claim.”273
Moreover, property that the debtor might acquire post-petition would
“cross-collateralize” the prepetition loan, further enhancing the senior
creditor’s security, even though those assets were meant to be available
to the estate unencumbered.
Courts historically worried about the leverage roll-ups would give
prebankruptcy lenders.274 Today, however, they appear to be
commonplace.275 The concern is that lenders like CIT in Jevic can
bargain for a roll-up because they can make it difficult for the debtor to
shop elsewhere for a loan. If, for example, the prebankruptcy lender
learns that a troubled debtor is attempting to negotiate for DIP financing
as part of its bankruptcy planning, the secured creditor may not
cooperate with other potential lenders or declare a default, forcing the
debtor to commence a Chapter 11 case before it is ready to do so.
Because corporate debtors’ assets are often fully encumbered, their
lender’s prebankruptcy priority will give them leverage to become the
only lender—and thus the lender under a priority-enhancing DIP loan.
This may seem counterintuitive, for two reasons: (1) why would the
prebankruptcy lender want to lend more to a troubled company? and (2)
unable to obtain financing in any other permissible manner and (2) there is adequate protection of
the interests of the holder of the lien on the property on which the senior lien is proposed to be
granted.” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)).
272. Lipson, supra note 114, at 252 (discussing development of roll-ups).
273. Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1251.
274. Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1098 (2d Cir.
1979) (disapproving cross-collateralization in that case but declining to forbid it per se); see also
Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 109, 115 (1986).
275. See Marcia L. Goldstein, Debtor in Possession Financing: Recommendations and
Rebalancing, in AM. BANKR. INST., DIP FINANCING, PRE-CONFIRMATION SALES AND OUT-OFCOURT RESTRUCTURINGS (2015) (“A debtor’s prepetition secured lenders are often the only party
willing to provide DIP financing. In fact, postpetition lenders have been the debtor’s prepetition
secured lenders in many of the major Chapter 11 cases filed over recent years.”); Lipson, supra note
114, at 252–56 (discussing roll-up in Colt bankruptcy).
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why would those who manage that company want to borrow on onerous
terms? The answer to the first is that Chapter 11 adds value that other
resolutions do not by providing a single forum and the preemptive power
of federal bankruptcy law to resolve the debtor’s distress.276 Controlling
the process assures the senior creditor of this value. The answer to the
second is more complex and likely reflects the fact that in many cases,
including Jevic, “turnaround” managers will have been appointed to
oversee the reorganization. For whom these managers actually act is not
entirely clear, but a cause for some concern. They may not act as
fiduciaries for the debtor’s residual claimants, in particular unsecured
creditors, as doctrine requires.277 Instead, relational theory predicts that
they may have greater loyalty to those whose relationships matter to
them, such as those with who control the debtor’s purse.278
The DIP loan in Jevic is a textbook example of the latter concern.
When the Jevic debtors filed their Chapter 11 petition on May 20, 2008
(the “petition date”), they asked the Bankruptcy Court to approve an
“emergency” $60 million loan from their prebankruptcy lender, CIT, on
a super-priority basis.279 Although the stated “emergency” was the need
to pay drivers to complete their routes,280 the bulk of the loan was
apparently used by CIT to repay itself.281 Under the DIP loan, CIT
276. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price
of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 870 (2014) (discussing the value added
by Chapter 11 reorganization).
277. Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially
Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2003) (“It has become commonplace—
perhaps trite—to observe that once a corporation is in financial distress, duties of care and loyalty
that ordinarily run solely to or for the benefit of shareholders ‘shift’ to corporate creditors.”).
278. Lipson, supra note 114, at 278 (discussing “turnaround managers” who may be appointed to
run the corporate debtor in chapter 11 and their loyalties).
279. DIP Motion, supra note 32, ¶¶ 26–27. The debtors also sought when they commenced the
case to appoint a “chief restructuring officer.” See Order Granting Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. Section 363 for Entry of an Order Approving the Retention of Morris Anderson &
Associates Ltd. & Designating Daniel Dooley as Chief Restructuring Officer Nunc Pro Tunc to the
Petition Date, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-01106 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2008).
280. According to the final order approving the financing, there was “[a]n immediate and critical
need . . . for the Debtors to . . . obtain secured financing in order to manage the wind-down of the
Debtor’s business, attempt to deliver all of the freight in their system, retrieve their assets and
effectuate a prompt and orderly liquidation of their assets and proceed towards a confirmable plan.”
Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors-in-Possession to Obtain Senior Debtor-in-Possession
Financing; (II) Granting Liens, Security Interests, & Superpriority Status; (III) Authorizing Use of
Cash Collateral; & (IV) Affording Adequate Protection to Prepetition Lenders ¶ 9, In re Jevic
Holding Corp., No. 08-01106 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2008) [hereinafter Final DIP Order].
281. Id. ¶ 43. (“[T]o the extent that the debtors obtain full and final approval of the Senior DIP
Financing at the Final Hearing and the conditions precedent under the Senior DIP Credit Agreement
to the availability of the Senior DIP Financing are satisfied or waived, then, within two business
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would have super-priority in the debtor’s assets, whether acquired before
or during bankruptcy. The DIP loan—a rollup used to pay the senior
creditor in a controlled liquidation—challenges the values of
participation, predictability, and procedural integrity that the Supreme
Court vindicated in striking the structured dismissal of the case.
1.

Participation and the Jevic DIP Financing

The DIP financing in Jevic constricted participation in a variety of
problematic ways. The first involved the process—or lack of process—
leading to the DIP loan, itself. In Jevic, the request for financing was
made on an emergency basis on the day the debtor commenced its case.
The Bankruptcy Court approved it on an interim basis at a hearing two
days later, and gave its final approval one month after the case was
commenced, June 20, 2008.282 When the motion was initially made,
there was no official committee of unsecured creditors to represent
Jevic’s estimated 5,000–10,000 unsecured creditors. That group was not
appointed until June 4, 2008,283 about two weeks after the interim
financing was approved, and two weeks before the final financing order
was entered on June 20, 2008. It appears from the docket that neither the
creditors’ committee nor the United States Trustee formally objected to
the DIP financing.284
As a practical matter, therefore, other stakeholders of the debtors had
little opportunity to scrutinize either the proposed DIP loan or the
prepetition loan that was rolled-up into it. So, for example, there is no
evidence that any party tested the debtor’s efforts to shop for other loans

days after the entry of the Final Order, the Debtors shall repay the Prepetition Lenders the then
remaining unpaid principal amount of the Prepetition Financing, any accrued but unpaid interest (at
the non-default rate), and reasonable professional fees and disbursements . . . .”). Thus, the loan was
used to pay CIT long before there was any judicial determination on its allowability. Id.; see also id.
at Exhibit A (budget for application of DIP loan proceeds).
282. See Final DIP Order, supra note 280.
283. See Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re Jevic Holding
Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 4, 2008).
284. The docket reveals only one limited objection to the DIP Financing, from Central Freight,
which alleged that about $350,000 in cash held by the debtors was “in trust” for Central Freight, and
so could not be subject to CIT’s lien. Limited Objection of Central Freight Lines, Inc. to Emergency
Motion for Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors-In-Possession to Enter into Senior Debtor-InPossession Credit Agreement & Obtain Postpetition Financing Pursuant to Sections 363 & 364 of
the Bankruptcy Code; (II) Granting Liens, Security Interests & Superpriority Claims; (III)
Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral; (IV) Affording Adequate Protection to Prepetition Lenders;
& (V) Providing for the Payment of Secured Prepetition Indebtedness, In re Jevic Holding Corp.,
No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 5, 2008).
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or better terms.285 While the debtor may have needed funding to
complete deliveries in transit, it is not clear why CIT needed to be repaid
in full at the outset of the case, as well. Nor, more importantly, would
there have been a meaningful opportunity to scrutinize CIT’s
prebankruptcy loan or conduct. This matters because, as discussed
below,286 the debtors had to agree to waive claims they had against CIT.
Despite the limited ability to scrutinize the DIP loan or CIT’s prebankruptcy conduct, the court approved it. In doing so, the court
converted CIT’s prepetition loan into a post-petition loan which,
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 364(c)(2), (c)(3), and (d),
constituted “valid, binding, enforceable, first priority, and perfected
Liens.”287 The new CIT loan would have priority over any other liens on
the debtor’s assets,288 and “super-priority” status over any first-priority
administrative expenses.289 To protect this priority, Jevic was prohibited
from incurring any first-priority administrative expenses, which would
ordinarily include all operating expenses during bankruptcy, as well as
professional fees. The super-priority status would continue even if the
debtor’s Chapter 11 case were converted to a liquidation under Chapter
7.290 Moreover, the loan could not be “crammed down” to the value of
the collateral in the event the debtor sought to confirm a plan of
reorganization that sought to do so.291 This would limit the debtor’s
options under any plan, if the case got that far.
The DIP loan also constrained participation for the rest of the case in
other ways. First, like most DIP lenders, the DIP loan gave CIT a “veto”

285. Interestingly, the affidavit submitted by David Gorman, Jevic’s CEO, said nothing about
efforts to obtain financing from any other lenders. He stated that CIT and the lenders in its group
were “willing to provide the financing contemplated herein,” and that he “believe[d] that [the
prepetition lenders] ha[d] acted in good faith in consenting to and in agreeing to provide the
postpetition financing contemplated by” the DIP Financing Motions. See Declaration of David H.
Gorman in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions & First Day Motions ¶ 61, In re Jevic Holding
Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2008).
286. See discussion in this section.
287. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 24.
288. Id. ¶ 26 (CIT’s DIP financing liens could not be “subordinated to or made pari passu with
any other Lien under section 364(d) of the Bankruptcy Code or otherwise.”).
289. Id. ¶ 29 (“priority . . . over all administrative expenses of the kind specified in section 503(b)
or 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code”).
290. Id.
291. As noted above, “[p]lans that are confirmed under section 1129(b) are often referred to as
cramdown plans because they have been ‘crammed down the throats of objecting creditors.’” River
Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal
citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S.
639 (2012).

05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY

6/6/2018 9:21 PM

693

over any major actions in the case.292 For example, the loan agreement
limited the debtors’ ability to make non-ordinary course payments,293
incur any indebtedness equal or senior in priority to the DIP financing,294
or to make any disbursements materially outside the budget incorporated
into the DIP financing.295 Moreover, many events that might occur in the
case would be defaults under the loan agreement, permitting CIT
immediately to foreclose. These included conversion of the case to a
Chapter 7 liquidation, or the appointment of a trustee or examiner;296
filing a plan or disclosure statement which did not provide for the full
payment of the DIP loan or to which CIT did not agree;297 making any
challenge to CIT’s prepetition claims298 or liens;299 the entry of an order
granting relief from the stay permitting other creditors to foreclose on
any of the debtor’s assets in excess of $50,000;300 or any change in
senior management of the debtor.301
Second, various provisions limited scrutiny of CIT’s conduct in the
LBO, which apparently contributed to the need for bankruptcy in the
first place.302 This would deter participation by litigation and prevent the
estate from recovering money or assets from CIT for distribution to
other creditors. For example, if CIT’s lien were not perfected, it would
292. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 50.
293. Exhibit A: Senior DIP Credit Agreement § 7.11, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006
(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2008) [hereinafter DIP Loan Agreement]. The form of DIP Loan
Agreement was attached to the DIP Motion, supra note 32, but the final, executed agreement does
not appear to be available. This discussion assumes that the executed version was the same as that
presented to the bankruptcy court.
294. DIP Loan Agreement, supra note 293, § 7.12.
295. Id. § 7.15.
296. Id. § 8.7(a).
297. Id. § 8.7(c).
298. Id. § 8.7(e).
299. Id. § 8.7(l).
300. Id. § 8.7(i).
301. Id. § 8.8.
302. The Final DIP Order provides that:
[E]ach of the Debtors has waived and shall be barred from (i) challenging the amount, validity,
extent, perfection, or priority or seeking to set aside, avoid, offset, or subordinate any of the
Prepetition Indebtedness or any Liens or security interests . . . and (ii) asserting any other
claims or causes of action against the [lenders] including, without limitation, claims for lender
liability or pursuant to sections 105, 510, 544, 547, 548, 549 or 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 39. The timing is ironic. The debtor first granted this waiver at
the outset of the case. Yet, one of the reasons given for the contested settlement was the cost and
difficulty of determining the merits of any of these causes action, which, by that point, had been
subject to several years of investigation and litigation. How could the DIP have known at the outset
of the case that it did not have claims that, at the end of the case, the major parties agreed were too
complex and difficult to litigate to term?
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not be enforceable at all in bankruptcy, but the DIP loan prevented the
debtor from challenging it on these grounds.303 Similarly, and more
concretely, the estate had fraudulent transfer claims against CIT that
were ultimately asserted by the creditors’ committee—but management
for the debtor had to waive the debtor’s right to pursue those claims
directly.304 While the creditors’ committee had authority to investigate
CIT’s prebankruptcy actions, it had only seventy-five days to do so,305
and any lawsuit that succeeded was an automatic default under the DIP
financing.306
Third, and more prosaically, lawyers for the creditors’ committee
would have a limited budget to conduct any investigation,307 and could
not use proceeds of the DIP financing to pay counsel for such
investigations.308 Because the assets of the estate were fully encumbered
by the DIP financing, there would be no cash in the estate other than
proceeds of the DIP financing with which to pay counsel to the
creditors’ committee to sue CIT. These limits may have played a role in
committee counsels’ ultimate decision to recommend the structured
dismissal that was later reversed by the Supreme Court. Without it, it
was not clear how they would have been paid; with it, it was.

303. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 551 (2012). If those loans were unperfected, it means that CIT would
have had no priority at all.
304. Even if the LBO liens were not fraudulent transfers, payments or liens CIT received in
connection with the LBO might have been avoidable as fraudulent transfers or, if occurring within
ninety days of the bankruptcy, preferential transfers. Id. §§ 544, 547–48.
305. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 39.
306. Id. (“The entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court, which results in the impairment of the
[prepetition loan and security interest] shall constitute an immediate Event of Default under this
Final Order and the Senior DIP Financing Documents.”).
307. The Final DIP Order also approved a “Carve-Out” for professional fees of $1.365 million for
estate professionals, and the lenders’ professionals. Id. ¶ 34. For a discussion of carveouts, see
Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445,
449 (2002) (maintaining that while “the carve out protects the professionals . . . it also may benefit
the secured creditor, which might have concluded that an orderly liquidation or restructuring
process is likely to result in the highest net recovery on its claim, even after payment of carve out
expenses”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The (Il)Legitimacy of Bankruptcies for the Benefit of Secured
Creditors, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 750 (noting that “[i]t is not unusual for a secured creditor to
carve out from proceeds of its collateral funds to cover professional fees and other administrative
expenses”).
308. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 41.
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, none of the Proceeds of the Senior DIP
Financing may be used by any of the Debtors, the Committee, or any other person or any entity
to (i) object to or contest in any manner the Senior DIP Indebtedness, or to assert or prosecute
any actions, claims, or causes of action against any of the Senior DIP Indebtedness, or to assert
or prosecute any actions, claims, or causes of action against any of the Senior DIP Agent . . . .
Id.
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In the structured dismissal hearing in Jevic, the bankruptcy judge
ruled that he would approve the settlement of the fraudulent transfer suit
due to the “dire circumstances”309 of the case: “[a] confirmable Chapter
11 plan was unattainable. And there would be no funds to operate,
investigate, or litigate were the case converted to a proceeding in
Chapter 7.”310 This may have been true. But a review of the terms of the
DIP financing in Jevic suggests that this was virtually inevitable from
the outset because the debtor’s assets were fully encumbered and could
not be used to pay any estate professionals—committee counsel or
counsel to the debtor in possession—to challenge the senior lenders’
prebankruptcy transactions or any estate officers, such as a trustee, in the
event the case was converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7.
Moreover, CIT’s “veto” rights under the DIP loan gave it the power to
decide how the rest of the case would proceed, including its exit path,
the technical problem ultimately before the Supreme Court.
2.

Predictability and Procedural Integrity in the Jevic DIP Loan

Arrogating power to senior creditors under DIP loans also threatens
predictability and procedural integrity. If important decisions in the case
are left to the whim of a single creditor, then it may be more difficult for
other stakeholders to predict outcomes and bargain around them. Too
much power may corrupt, and that may be the problem we see
developing with DIP lending.
As a DIP lender, the senior creditor may initially agree with other
parties to attempt a reorganization in place through a Chapter 11 plan.
But if it becomes impatient with the process or simply disagrees with
management’s strategy, the DIP loan would give the lender the power to
call the loan, making it virtually impossible for the debtor to take
meaningful action. This may eliminate residual value that would
otherwise flow to junior creditors. Even if a court were somehow able to
preclude a DIP lender from exercising its rights under the DIP loan, its
contractual leverage should lead most participants to think twice before
proceeding without the DIP lender’s blessing.
Consolidating this much power in the hands of a single stakeholder
threatens the integrity of the process. The mechanisms built into the
Jevic DIP loan deterred challenges to CIT’s conduct in connection with
309. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 982 (2017) (“The court
accordingly decided to grant the motion in light of the ‘dire circumstances’ facing the estate and its
creditors.”).
310. Id.
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the LBO, and efforts to avoid impermissible transfers of property of the
debtor. If lenders such as CIT are able to use DIP financings to shield
themselves from liability, there will be little reason to respect fraudulent
transfer and similar law designed to protect creditors. Senior creditor
power exercised through DIP loans enables them to turn the process on
its head, to insulate themselves from scrutiny by the very creditors the
system was meant to protect.
To be sure, a single dominant secured party may also present
economies of scale not available with multiple lenders. Fights between
different tranches of secured debt suggest that there is not necessarily
strength in numbers. So, the point is not that we should eliminate
priority, or even its vesting in a single senior creditor. Rather, the point
is that that creditor should not be able to use its seniority to materially
impair participation, predictability, and the integrity of the process.
C.

Asset Sales

Although Chapter 11 was designed to encourage going concerns to
reorganize “in place,” Congress recognized that a debtor may need to
sell assets before a plan is confirmed. As noted above, “363 sales” are
common means of restructuring debtors, and may well be justified in
many cases.311 Jevic was one such case. Problems of process quality can
arise, however, when senior creditors insert themselves into the sale
process. Sales have become popular with senior creditors because they
may enable the creditor to cash out quickly and, perhaps equally
important, to use their leverage to influence the sale process in at least
three ways.312
1.

Sale Timing

First, the senior creditor may seek to control the timing of the sale
through its position as DIP lender. Usually, this means sooner rather
than later. This takes us back to the Chapter 11 bankruptcies of
311. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”).
312. There are different views about how often senior creditors actually demand sales. Compare
Baird, supra note 13, at 811 (“The senior creditors can often use their ability to withhold financing
as a lever to ensure the speedy sale happens.”), with Westbrook, supra note 261, at 844 (“The
conventional narrative assumes that cases that are controlled by secured creditors are likely to
involve section 363 sales. That part of the narrative also appears open to serious question. Cases
with a high percentage of secured debt seem less likely to have sales of assets . . . .”). But, as shown
in this subpart, there is little question that senior creditors can significantly influence the process, if
they wish to do so.
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automakers Chrysler and General Motors.313 As noted above, in these
cases, the government had become the automakers’ senior lenders under
DIP loans in the respective cases. In Chrysler, the United States and
Canadian governments facilitated negotiations with Fiat and Chrysler to
produce a sale agreement dated April 30, 2009, the same day that
Chrysler filed its Chapter 11 petition.314 GM filed its Chapter 11 petition
on June 1 and, on the same day, the court approved its proposed sale
transaction under section 363.315 The Bankruptcy Court in GM
determined that, like Chrysler, there was a “need for speed” in
approving the 363 Transaction:
Other than the U.S. Treasury and [Canadian government], there
are no lenders willing and able to finance GM’s continued
operations. Similarly, there are no lenders willing and able to
finance GM in a prolonged Chapter 11 case. The continued
availability of the financing provided by the Treasury is
expressly conditioned upon approval of [the 363 Motion] by
July 10, and prompt closing of the 363 Transaction . . . . Without
such financing, GM faces immediate liquidation.316
The problem with speed is that it is often unclear whether the sale
maximizes value because it stanches the bleeding, or is instead evidence
of collusion between senior creditors, managers and purchasers.
Assessing the automaker cases, Professors Jacoby and Janger recently
observed that “[t]he answer is a little bit of both.”317
This suggests that courts should be mindful of the participatory
effects of the pace they permit. Severe time constraints may limit
shopping of a debtor’s assets and potential purchasers’ efforts to conduct
due diligence. These participatory failures may, in turn, depress bids.
Although concerned creditors can object to the sale process, and the sale
itself, the standard that governs such sales, as noted above, is quite
loose: “business judgment.”318 Absent evidence of collusion—which
takes time to ascertain—it seems unlikely that an individual creditor
could object effectively. A creditors’ committee would have standing to
object, but speed will also limit its effectiveness. Appealing a sale order
is difficult because winning bidders enjoy special protections to promote
313. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State
Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (mem.).
314. Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 111–12 (2d Cir. 2009).
315. GM Debtors’ Motion, supra note 187.
316. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
317. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 276, at 866.
318. See discussion supra section I.B.1.
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closure. Bankruptcy sales are usually final and difficult to appeal absent
a showing of collusion.319
It may seem counterintuitive that a senior creditor would rush a sale
that depresses bids for the assets. But, this might happen either because
the senior creditor believes the asset values are declining—the “ice cube
is melting,” in the vernacular—or, as discussed below, it would prefer to
acquire the assets itself, through a credit bid.
A senior creditor’s power to control timing also reduces
predictability. Whether there will be a quick sale may—or may not—be
clear from the outset. In any case, if the senior creditor has the power
under a DIP loan agreement to control when the sale occurs, then it—
and not the interests of other stakeholders or participants, such as
potential purchasers—will strongly influence when the sale occurs. It
may be difficult to know the senior creditor’s views or motivations—or
that the senior creditor’s strategy will necessarily be sound. Priority may
confer procedural power, but there is no evidence that priority reduces a
senior creditor’s fallibility.
Speed also threatens procedural integrity because it will be difficult
for parties to know whether there was collusion among the senior
creditor, the purchaser, and/or select other creditors. For example, a
serious concern raised in the automaker cases was that the senior
creditors were able to use their leverage not only to rush the sales, but
also to effectively foreclose any scrutiny of the “winners” and “losers”
that were picked among the debtors’ suppliers. Some suppliers were
entitled to continue to sell to the post-bankruptcy carmakers, and they
would obviously fare better than those who did not. Were those deals the
product of arms’ length bargaining or illicit pressure? The need for
speed and finality made it practically impossible to anticipate or
challenge the outcomes there. As noted above, while it may be possible
to view Jevic as resolving unfinished business from Chrysler, it does not
change the fact that many were left queasy about the integrity of the
process there.320
2.

Credit Bidding

A second way that senior creditors may control the sale process will
be through “credit bidding.” Bankruptcy Code section 363(k) permits a
secured creditor to use the debt owed to it as “credit” toward the
purchase price for the debtor’s assets if the creditor happens to be the
319. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012).
320. See, e.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 16, at 1378; Roe & Skeel, supra note 28.
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purchaser.321 The premise is straightforward: instead of using cash, the
creditor can bid for the debtor’s assets in the amount of its claim against
the debtor.322 If the credit bid is the winning bid, the creditor can take
possession of the collateral323 and offset the amount of her claim against
the purchase price of the property.324
A secured creditor’s right to credit bid is not absolute and may be
limited “for cause.”325 As in other contexts, the Bankruptcy Code does
not define the term “cause,” but as with timing, the chief concern has
been distributive, that the right to credit bid may chill competitive
bidding.326 Proponents of credit bidding argue that it promotes
competition because other potential bidders will view the senior
creditor’s bid as an informed signal of confidence in the value of the
debtor’s assets.327 But this assumes that the senior creditor knows more
about the assets than potential purchasers.328 The senior creditor may,
however, be wrong, and other purchases will not know. Fearing that the
“ice cube is melting,” other potential bidders may (wrongly) assume that
the senior creditor is undersecured, and there would be no sense in

321. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (“At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is subject
to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such
claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder
may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.”).
322. Randall Klein & Danielle Juhle, Majority Rules: Non-Cash Bids and the Reorganization
Sale, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 297, 317 (2010). Creditors may also cash bid for any residual amount
necessary to purchase the property. Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and
the Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 104 (2010).
323. Quality Props. Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Trump Va. Acquisitions, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-00053, 2012
WL 3542527, at *7 n.13 (W.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2012) (“By using its credit to outbid a sale to a third
party at a lower price, the secured creditor can choose to take possession of its collateral . . . .”);
Buccola & Keller, supra note 322, at 102.
324. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2018); see also Bellair, Inc., v. Aviall of Tex., Inc., 819 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App. 1991) (“Setoff
is the doctrine of bringing into the presence of each other the obligations of A to B and B to A, and
by the judicial action of the court making each obligation extinguish the other.” (quoting Nalle v.
Harrell, 12 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. 1939))).
325. In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 464 B.R. 337, 347–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
326. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 316 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Fisker Auto.
Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55, 60 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); In re The Free Lance-Star Publ’g Co. of
Fredericksburg, 512 B.R. 798, 806 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
327. Buccola & Keller, supra note 322, at 100.
328. See, e.g., In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 81 B.R. 682, 688 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (“FABT’s credit
bid escalated the bidding and enabled the Trustee to realize an additional $450,000.00 more than
General Health’s bid of $15,050,000.00.”).
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attempting to submit a topping bid.329 Or, they would not view the assets
as having sufficient value to justify the cost of investigation.
As with a senior creditor’s ability to influence the speed of a sale,
credit bidding creates risks of error and expropriation. The American
Bankruptcy Institute’s Chapter 11 Commission recently conceded that
“all credit bidding chills an auction process to some extent” but “did not
believe that the chilling effect of credit bids alone should suffice as
cause under section 363(k).”330 Like super-priority DIP lending, credit
bidding has the potential to undermine process values of participation,
predictability, and procedural integrity.
3.

Controlling the Distribution of Sale Proceeds—“Gifting” and
Property of the Estate?

Senior creditors may also challenge Jevic’s process values by using
their priority to manipulate what constitutes property of the estate, and
thus control final distributions. In theory, the proceeds of a sale of the
debtor are property of the estate, which must be distributed in order of
priority unless a priority creditor consents. But, if the assets were
encumbered, the proceeds would also be subject to the senior creditors’
lien.331 Senior creditors have used this property-based position to argue
that their priority in the debtor’s assets entitles them to make a “gift” of
it to induce junior stakeholders to support a resolution that the senior
creditor prefers. In theory, this is usually impermissible.332 In practice,
however, senior creditors appear to use their priority to control this
aspect of the process as well.
For example, on the same day in January 2015 that Jevic was argued
before the Third Circuit, another panel of the Third Circuit heard
argument in In re ICL Holding Co. (LifeCare).333 LifeCare involved a
329. Geoffrey K. McDonald, The Road Not Taken: RadLAX and the Unstated Constitutional
Basis and Limits of a Secured Creditor’s Right to Credit Bid at a Bankruptcy Sale of Its Collateral,
2014 ANN. SURV. BANKR. LAW 9.
330. See ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 147.
331. U.C.C. § 9-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
332. Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 2005) (forbidding interclass gifting), and DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d
79, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (same), with Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg.
Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993) (permitting gifting in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
333. 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015). Both were argued Jan. 14, 2015. See id.; Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.
2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). The
LifeCare debtors had previously been known as “Lifecare.” LifeCare Holdings, Inc. was at one time
a leading operator of long-term acute care hospitals. See In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 549–50.
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“quick sale” of the debtors, a healthcare provider, to its secured
creditors.334 Prior to the sale, the debtors had apparently marketed
themselves to various suitors, none of whom were willing to pay more
than about 80% of the outstanding secured debt. The secured creditors,
on the other hand, were willing to credit bid about 90% of what they
were owed, and to pay the costs of professionals, including a creditors’
committee.335 One day before going into bankruptcy, the debtors entered
into an asset purchase agreement with the secured creditors.336 Although
the opinion is somewhat unclear on this, it appears that as part of the
purchase agreement, and prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy,
the secured creditors also deposited funds into separate escrow accounts
to cover the costs of professionals and to wind down the debtor’s
operations.337
The creditors’ committee and United States Government objected to
the sale.338 The committee argued that the sale was a “veiled
foreclosure” that would leave the bankruptcy estate administratively
insolvent, unable to pay expenses such as committee counsel’s fees.339
As in Jevic, the senior creditors and the creditors’ committee then
entered into a settlement agreement. The secured creditors agreed to
deposit $3.5 million in trust for the benefit of general unsecured
While in Chapter 11, Lifecare was referred to as “LCI.” According to Judge Ambro, “per its plan of
reorganization it became ‘ICL.’” Id. at 549 n.1. It is not entirely clear what this means. A search of
the docket reveals no evidence that a plan was ever confirmed. See Dkt., In re ICL Holding Co.,
No. 12-13319-KG (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 11, 2012). Instead, it appears to have been resolved by a
structured dismissal similar in certain respects to that involved in Jevic.
334. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 551 (“[T]he [Bankruptcy] Court described LifeCare’s
condition as getting progressively worse; in bankruptcy talk, it was a ‘melting ice cube.’”).
335. Id. at 550 (the secured creditors agreed to “credit $320 million of the $355 million debt they
were then owed”).
336. Id. (“filed for bankruptcy one day after entering into the Asset Purchase Agreement”).
337. Judge Ambro explained:
In addition to its credit bid, the purchaser [secured creditors] agreed to pay the legal and
accounting fees of LifeCare and the Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and
to pick up the tab for the company’s wind-down costs. Because the professionals hadn’t
completed their work, the agreement directed the purchaser to deposit cash funds into separate
escrow accounts. Any money that went unspent had to be returned to it.
Id.
338. Id. at 551.
339. Id. at 550–51. Of course, if the valuations were correct, this would appear to be true even if
the bankruptcy court had not approved the sale. In that event, it seems most likely that the cases
would have been dismissed and the secured creditors would have foreclosed on the debtors’ assets,
which might have been complicated, since the debtors had thirty-four subsidiaries, “which together
operated 27 long-term acute care hospitals in 10 states and had about 4,500 employees.” Id. at 550.
A state foreclosure sale—the secured creditors’ other real option—seemed considerably less
efficient than a sale through bankruptcy.
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creditors, skipping over the “mid-priority” tax claims of the government,
which claimed that the sale would result in about $24 million in capital
gains tax liability.340 The government objected, arguing that making a
distribution to junior unsecured creditors violated the absolute priority
rule.341 The bankruptcy court effectively dodged the question, however,
because it found that the escrowed funds were not property of the estate
at all, and thus not subject to the ordinary priority rules. Rather,
“because the Settlement Agreement permits a distribution directly to the
unsecured creditors from the purchaser, it is an indication that [the
funds] are not property of [LifeCare’s] estate[,] and as such, the absolute
priority rule . . . is not implicated.”342
The government appealed both the bankruptcy court’s approval of the
sale and the settlement. The issue, in substance, was whether “the
escrowed funds and settlement money were proceeds paid to obtain
LifeCare’s assets, and thus qualify as estate property that should have
been (but wasn’t) paid out according to the Code’s creditor-payment
scheme.”343 If these funds were property of the estate, the priority rules
might apply to them (a question that Jevic later answered affirmatively).
If not, then it is not clear that any Bankruptcy Code distributive rules
would apply to them. The Bankruptcy Code does not, as a general
matter, affect property that is not property of the estate.344
Bankruptcy Code section 541(a)(1) defines “property of the estate” as
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”345 Section 541(a)(6) provides that property
of the estate includes “proceeds . . . of or from property of the estate.”346
Thus, Judge Ambro reasoned for the Third Circuit that “if either the
escrowed funds or settlement sums are ‘proceeds of or from property of
the estate,’ they qualify as estate property.”347 The government argued
340. Id. at 551 (“The Government, for its part, argued that the sale would result in capital-gains
tax liability estimated at $24 million, giving it an administrative claim that would go unpaid.”).
341. Id. at 552 (government argued that “the settlement money was property of the estate” and
that “bypassing it and paying the unsecured creditors disturbed the Code’s priority scheme for the
payment of creditors”).
342. Id. at 552 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
343. Id. at 555.
344. Bankruptcy has long been viewed as a process “in rem,” although this is a bit of a fiction.
See Michelle M. Harner, The Value of Soft Variables in Corporate Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 509; Jonathan C. Lipson, Fighting Fiction with Fiction—The New Federalism in (A Tobacco
Company) Bankruptcy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1271 (2000).
345. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
346. Id. § 541(a)(6).
347. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 555.
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that the settlement proceeds were property of the estate because “the
secured lenders’ payment to the Committee was in substance an
increased bid for LifeCare’s assets.”348
Judge Ambro rejected this. While it was “true that the secured lenders
paid cash to resolve objections to the sale of LifeCare’s assets, that
money never made it into the estate.”349 Rather, relying on the analysis
of the bankruptcy court in In re TISC, Inc.,350 he reasoned that where
“the purchaser’s ‘funds [were] not proceeds from a secured creditor’s
liens, [they] do not belong to the estate, and will not become part of the
estate.’”351 So, too, here:
[T]he secured lender group, using that group’s own funds, made
payments to unsecured creditors . . . . [T]he settlement sums
paid by the purchaser were not proceeds from its liens, did not at
any time belong to LifeCare’s estate, and will not become part
of its estate even as a pass-through.352
Contra Jevic, Judge Ambro in LifeCare believed that there was no
property that was clearly property of the estate, available for distribution
to unsecured creditors.
In LifeCare, the government had also objected to the treatment of the
professional fees and wind-down expenses, which had been escrowed by
the senior creditor prior to bankruptcy and which, Judge Ambro
observed, presented “a more difficult question.”353 The government had
argued that these, too, had to be considered property of the estate
because they were explicitly made part of the purchase price paid to the
debtor prior to the bankruptcy.354 Although Judge Ambro acknowledged
that “aspects of the Government’s argument are factually correct, we
cannot ignore the economic reality of what actually occurred.”355
The “economic reality,” Judge Ambro reasoned, was that the secured
creditors purchased all of the debtors’ assets, including their cash. While
some of that cash was to be used to consummate the transaction, it was
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. 393 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
351. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 556 (quoting In re TSIC, 393 B.R. at 77).
352. Id. at 555–56.
353. Id. at 556.
354. Id. (“The Government urges us to reverse that ruling because the funds were listed in
subsections 3.1(a) and (b) of the Asset Purchase Agreement as part of the purchase price (indeed,
they were called ‘[c]onsideration’) for LifeCare’s assets and thus qualify as estate property under
Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6) (including as property of the estate ‘proceeds’ from a debtor’s asset
sale).”).
355. Id.
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held in escrow, not generally available to the debtors, and any residual
was to revert to the purchasers, and not remain with the debtors.
Moreover, and perhaps more basically, because the senior creditors were
under-secured credit bidders, “once the sale closed, there technically was
no more estate property.”356
Judge Ambro “recognize[d] that, in the abstract, it may seem strange
for a creditor to claim ownership of cash that it parted with in exchange
for something.”357 Here, however, he maintained that “it makes sense”
because the escrowed funds in question were “to facilitate . . . a
smooth . . . transfer of the assets from the debtors’ estates to [the secured
lenders] by resolving objections to that transfer.”358 “To assure that no
funds reached LifeCare’s estate, the secured lenders agreed to pay cash
for services and expenses through escrow arrangements.”359
LifeCare is a difficult and troubling decision. Some may think that
Jevic negates it, because Jevic in substance forbad what LifeCare
permitted. That, however, may be a hasty conclusion. LifeCare answered
a different question: what was property of the estate to begin with?360
Jevic did not address this, instead assuming (correctly) that the payments
to settle the estate’s fraudulent transfer suit were property of the estate, a
point Judge Scirica made explicitly in his dissent in the court of appeals
and that no one seriously challenged thereafter.361 Jevic may be about
priority, whereas LifeCare is about property of the estate. Whatever

356. “Put another way,” he explained the following:
[G]etting $320 million of its secured debt forgiven resulted in the secured lender group getting
all the property of LifeCare. This is an important point. The Government’s argument presumes
that any residual cash from the sale—namely the monies earmarked for fees and wind-down
costs—would become property of LifeCare. . . . But that is impossible because LifeCare agreed
to surrender all of its cash. And, per the sale order, whatever remains of the $1.8 million in
escrow goes back to where it came from—the secured lenders’ account (as indeed happened by
the time of oral argument to over $800,000 placed into escrow). Thus, as a matter of substance,
we cannot conclude that the escrowed funds were estate property.
Id.
357. Id. at 557.
358. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
359. Id.
360. Courts since Jevic seem untroubled by the holding in LifeCare. See, e.g., Hargreaves v.
Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc. (In re Nuverra Envtl. Solutions., Inc.), No. 17-10949-KJC, 2017 WL
3326453, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017) (citing LifeCare for proposition that a “gift from senior
lenders to certain, but not all, classes of general unsecured creditors” is permissible).
361. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 188 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Critical to this analysis is the fact that the money paid by
the secured creditors in the settlement was property of the estate.”), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
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effect priority has is not relevant to property that is not property of the
estate.362
But LifeCare suggests that priority does confer on senior secured
creditors the power to influence the determination of what is property of
the estate under some conditions, and this is problematic. Both the
prepetition escrow and post-petition trusts contained funds that could
have been proceeds of property of the estate, because “proceeds”
includes property received on account of, or arising from, property of the
estate.363 Perhaps because the latter resulted from settling the
committee’s objection, they were somehow different than the proceeds
of the fraudulent transfer settlement in Jevic. But that seems oddly
formalistic: in both LifeCare and Jevic, funds were paid to resolve rights
asserted on behalf of the estate. It is not clear why they would have been
exclusively property of the senior creditor in LifeCare but property of
the estate in Jevic.
Yet, it is not hard to see why the Third Circuit believed that the
exigencies of the case required the court to accommodate the deal the
secured creditors and debtors had crafted. The LifeCare debtors operated
twenty-seven long-term acute care hospitals in ten states and had about
4,500 employees.364 If the value of the debtors was in fact below the
amount of the senior claims, the senior creditors were undersecured;
there would have been no equity in the estate with which to pay any
unsecured creditors, whether priority or otherwise. The fact that the
important transactions were structured before and outside bankruptcy
meant, at least to Judge Ambro, that these transactions determined the
size and shape of the estate in bankruptcy. It appears that the senior
creditors largely called these shots, and because they were undersecured,
no one was in a position to challenge this.
All of this would seem to be in tension with Jevic’s process values.
The LifeCare deal as structured may have been meant “to facilitate . . . a
smooth . . . transfer of the assets from the debtors’ estates to [the secured
lenders] by resolving objections to that transfer.”365 But, it may also have
been structured to facilitate a fraudulent or preferential transfer or, as the
362. But see David R. Kuney, Implications of Czyewski v. Jevic: Will Jevic Alter the Delicate
Leverage of Bankruptcy Bargaining?, in AM. BANKR. INST., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES: EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS 8, 16–19 (2017), https://ncbjmeeting.org/pyny
9804/NCBJ17_ABI_Materials_Book_5%20programs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5L3-R7MH]
(discussing unpublished opinion in In re Constellation Enterprises, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00757-UNA
(D. Del.), applying Jevic to property that was arguably not property of the estate).
363. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
364. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 550.
365. Id. at 557 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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government insinuated, a way to avoid paying capital gains tax. Whether
the deal could have been challenged on those grounds depends on the
value of the debtor’s assets and the quality of management’s efforts to
market the debtors. Here, perhaps the court took comfort in the fact
management apparently marketed the debtors to over 100 potential
purchasers prior to agreeing to the “sale” to the secured creditors and
could find no better deal.366
But, given the structure of the sale, there was little way to check this.
Participation involves, among other things, scrutiny. That is ordinarily
the job of counsel to the creditors’ committee. It is not, however, clear
how a committee could do so under these conditions. While the
committee objected to the sale, it is unlikely that committee counsel was
able to investigate and challenge management’s prebankruptcy efforts to
sell the debtors. Nor do we know whether an effort to market and sell the
debtors through a more conventional section 363 sale in bankruptcy
(rather than before) might have produced a price that topped the credit
bid and produced a better return to the estate. Nor is it clear whether
committee counsel could have investigated and challenged prepetition
payments the senior creditors may have received. Under ordinary rules
regarding the avoidance of preferential transfers, property of the debtors
that they received during the ninety days before bankruptcy may have
been recoverable by the estate.367 If nothing else, the agreement to sell
the debtor’s assets one day before bankruptcy would have been a
transfer that warranted this scrutiny. These are all forms of participation
that the deal structure in LifeCare made difficult, if not impossible.
Moreover, giving the senior creditor the power to direct the sale
proceeds undercuts the participatory logic of Jevic. If participation
includes the power to decide how final distributions are made, then
permitting the senior creditor to pick and choose which other creditors
are paid via the Chapter 11 process is problematic because that process
exists in part to give all stakeholders a say in what becomes of the
debtor’s assets. The senior creditor that wants to control the distribution
of a debtor’s assets may do so under generally applicable state law, such
as the Uniform Commercial Code, outside of bankruptcy. It is difficult
to justify the existence of the Chapter 11 process, however, if it merely
serves the distributive goals of senior creditors.
LifeCare would also seem to tolerate a level of unpredictability that is
problematic under Jevic, for two reasons. First, vesting a single creditor
366. According to the opinion, the debtors were marketed to 106 potential purchasers. Id. at 550.
367. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012).
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group with the power to pick winners, rather than the vote of the whole,
or resorting to absolute priority, makes it hard for creditors to know ex
ante whether (or what) they will be paid. The senior creditor’s power to
control whether there was a valuation and then who got paid what from
the settlement meant that final distributions were at the whim of a single
group of secured creditors. Second, the Third Circuit’s approach to
property of the estate is destabilizing. Giving senior creditors the power
to structure transactions in order to enable them to determine what is and
is not property of the estate cedes courts’ power to make that
determination independently. While “property” is sometimes a
contentious doctrinal category, its use in LifeCare creates greater
uncertainty for future cases, where we can expect senior creditors to use
similar tactics to control the reorganization process.
And all of this threatens the procedural integrity of the Chapter 11
process. It is hard to look at the deal in LifeCare and avoid the
conclusion that it was structured to avoid taxes. Maybe it would not
survive scrutiny under tax law. But bankruptcy law and practice should
not tolerate that result either. It is perhaps ironic in that the U.S.
government was the senior creditor in the automaker cases, where it used
its senior status to force through quick sales and pick and choose
“winners” among the debtors’ creditors. Here, the U.S. government, as
taxing authority, was on the other side, and understandably unhappy
about it. Perhaps, the LifeCare court believed, what is sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander.
V.

OPPORTUNITIES AFTER JEVIC

Still, Jevic is now the law of the land, and its process-value
framework may limit LifeCare’s property-based logic. Determining
whether it does so presents one of several opportunities that Jevic creates
for scholars and practitioners. This part briefly sketches several others.
A.

Opportunities for Scholars

Jevic’s process values invite observers to investigate the relationship
between priority and process. For those who are empirically minded,
consider some questions:
How does Jevic affect the supply of, and demand for, various
resolution mechanisms in bankruptcy? Does Jevic raise the cost of
using Chapter 11 by requiring more plans and fewer structured
dismissals after Jevic? Or do crafty lawyers devise new
mechanisms, suggested by LifeCare, that may get around Jevic’s
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narrowly tailored holding, undercutting its process values along the
way?
How does Jevic affect resource allocation within Chapter 11 cases?
Do we observe smaller DIP loans, larger carveouts, or other
mechanisms that alter estate liquidity after Jevic? The process
values Jevic seems to have in mind are not costless. Paying for
them may require the use of assets otherwise subject to a lien.
How does Jevic affect governance in reorganization? Does it result
in increased committee power? Or does it fragment that power, as
individual creditors use Jevic’s consent standard to assert strategic
objections, perhaps conflicting with the goals of committee
counsel?
How does Jevic affect the 363 sale? Do we find greater market
participation after Jevic? Or do the dynamics of sales remain
unchanged?
How does Jevic affect “gifting,” whether under plans or otherwise?
One reading of Jevic may be that it forbids gifting because it
requires absolute priority and individuates consent: even a
confirmed plan could not overcome it. Yet, the property-based
logic of LifeCare may be compelling to some. If so, then the
important question is the value of the collateral—a determination
that the secured creditor may be able to control.
Does Jevic affect aggregate use of Chapter 11? If Jevic reduces the
value of Chapter 11 to senior creditors because it constrains their
control, perhaps senior creditors will increasingly foreclose outside
bankruptcy?
For those who are more conceptually oriented, Jevic squarely presents
in bankruptcy the question scholars of broader procedural domains have
wrestled with for many years: how do we compare the costs and benefits
of alternative processes?368 In its modern form, the question is oriented
around the extent to which contract can or should displace ostensibly
“mandatory” rules of civil procedure and evidence. Proponents of
“contract procedure” suggest that permitting parties to customize
adjudicative options promotes efficient outcomes both for the parties
themselves and courts.369 Opponents worry about both distributive
368. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 257 (1974) (examining the “conditions under which greater specificity or greater
generality is the efficient choice” in the legal process based on a cost-benefit analysis).
369. See, e.g., Jay Brudz & Jonathon M. Redgrave, Using Contract Terms to Get Ahead of
Prospective eDiscovery Costs and Burdens in Commercial Litigation, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13
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infirmities—the weak will unwittingly contract away their right to
discovery, for example—and public values such as the inherent merits of
the adversary system, the creation of a stock of accessible precedent, and
so on.370 Although this is a large and growing body of literature, it has
made no apparent headway among bankruptcy scholars.371 If Jevic is
telling us something about the relationship between (private) priority
rights and (public) process values, it invites a richer assessment of the
relationship between these two bodies of scholarship.
B.

Opportunities for Practitioners

Jevic has already affected practice, leading at least one court to refuse
to approve a structured dismissal on grounds that priority creditors
objected.372 Some worry that Jevic may threaten other practices that have
developed in Chapter 11, on grounds that they defy an “absolute” theory
of priority, such as “first-day” orders that prepay wages and vendors
“critical” to the debtors’ survival.373 While these concerns seem
somewhat exaggerated—Jevic was careful to speak only about final
distributions374—it remains true that junior stakeholders, and those who
would advocate for them, are often at odds with senior creditors, and that
the inflection points are procedural moments: DIP financing and asset
sales.
While there are litigated solutions to these problems, I have argued
elsewhere that under the right conditions, contract may be a superior
(2012); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality:
Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (2009); Robert E. Scott & George
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006).
370. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005) (focusing largely on post-dispute contracting); David H.
Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085
(2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181.
371. An earlier hint came from Steve Schwarcz who argued plausibly that “when a debtor and all
of its creditors agree to a procedure contract, there is little question that the contract should be
enforced.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77
TEX. L. REV. 515, 600 (1999). While true, this describes idealized conditions that almost never
occur in bankruptcy, and so cannot solve the problems the system faces.
372. In re Fryar, 570 B.R. 602, 610 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017).
373. See, e.g., Georgakopoulos, supra note 3, at 934–36.
374. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 984 (2017)
(forbidding payments approved by the lower courts as “the exact kind of nonconsensual priorityviolating final distributions that the Code prohibits in Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 plans”).
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basis for reordering in bankruptcy. The bench and bar in large
bankruptcies form a “contracting environment,” a fairly discrete
universe of repeat players.375 These relationships are a double-edged
sword: they might invite collusive conduct that offends Jevic, or they
may create opportunities for innovation—or both. Channeled properly,
they can help to address the problems of expropriation and error that dog
corporate reorganization.
1.

Case Financing After Jevic

Consider first adjustments to the design of case financing agreements.
As noted above, these seem to be the key mechanism by which senior
creditors seize control. Participants can avoid some of the process
problems that led to Jevic through broader carveouts. Carveouts in
bankruptcy are sometimes viewed as the price that senior lenders must
“pay to play.”376 If Jevic induces participants to rethink DIP loans like
the one there, which hog-tie the debtor at the outset, they may conclude
that a larger carveout is the solution. In the past, courts seemed to take
the position that DIP loans had to include generous carveouts.377
Bankruptcy judges cannot, however, force senior creditors to grant
carveouts. They can seek to persuade the DIP lender to make these
concessions. Moreover, they can threaten to convert or dismiss the case
if the senior creditors do not accede. But that may be a game of chicken
bankruptcy judges do not want to play.
Similarly, courts should consider approving DIP loans in smaller
increments. It is not clear why courts must approve large DIP loans on
an “emergency” basis at the outset of a case. As seen in Jevic, while
there may have been an urgent need for about $5 million to cover costs
of goods in transit, the bulk of the DIP loan was apparently earmarked to
pay off CIT, the prepetition senior creditor. It is hard to see how this was
375. Lipson, supra note 114, at 245 (“[L]arge Chapter 11 cases now create what Robert Scott, a
leading relational theorist, would call a ‘contracting environment.’” (citing Robert E. Scott, The
Promise and the Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP
OF STEWART MACAULAY 105, 108 (Braucher et al. eds., 2013))).
376. Mooney, Jr., supra note 307, at 750–51 (“Commentators have noted that in a secured
creditor bankruptcy the secured creditor may be required to ‘pay to play’—i.e., to carve out of its
collateral funds for the benefit of general unsecured creditors.”).
377. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[I]t has been
the uniform practice in this Court . . . to insist on a carve out from a super-priority status and postpetition lien in a reasonable amount designed to provide for payment of the fees of debtor’s and the
committees’ counsel and possible trustee’s counsel in order to preserve the adversary system.
Absent such protection, the collective rights and expectations of all parties-in-interest are sorely
prejudiced.”).
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an emergency. Of course, if it was an emergency, CIT already had a
remedy: foreclosure in state court outside of bankruptcy. But it appears
that CIT, like many senior lenders, did not want that process, preferring
Chapter 11.
DIP carveouts and loan size/timing affect participation. Without an
adequate carveout, committee counsel cannot effectively represent all
unsecured creditors. If a debtor’s assets are fully encumbered by a postpetition lien, it is not clear how effectively anyone other than the secured
creditor can participate in meaningful decisions about the debtor’s fate.
Moreover, there are specific terms in DIP loans that courts should
forbid. Provisions that trigger defaults if the estate investigates or sues
the senior creditor have no place in this context, because they undermine
predictability and procedural integrity. Prohibiting committee counsel or
other estate professionals from using estate funds to do so has the same
effect. So too with estate waivers of claim objections, or the release of
claims against senior creditors in a DIP loan.
2.

Asset Sales After Jevic

Those concerned about constraints on participation in sales should
consider the use of “earnouts.” Sometimes called a “contingent price”
agreement, an earnout provides that a portion of the purchase price in the
sale of a business will be deferred until after the sale, and paid based on
the post-closing performance of the business, as run by the buyer.378
Although these can be complicated, in substance they are similar to the
“ice cube bond” advocated by Jacoby and Janger.379 Under an ice-cube
bond, the purchaser would post a bond to assure that it was not
underpaying due to the hasty nature of the sale. The sale would close,
however, producing the closure that many deem essential to the process.
The main differences between a bond and an earnout appear to be that
earnouts are more price-sensitive and better known to practitioners. The
problem with ice cube bonds is the problem with all distributive
decisions made under poor procedural and informational conditions: the
risks of expropriation and error are high. It is not clear, for example, how
or when to price the ice-cube bond, how to decide whether the estate
378. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239, 266 (1984) (“[A] complete earnout formula is a complicated state-contingent
contract that, by carefully specifying in advance the impact on the purchase price of all events that
might occur during the earnout period, substantially reduces the incentives and opportunity for the
parties to behave strategically.”).
379. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 276, at 935–37 (discussing proposed timing of release of
purchase-price in bankruptcy sales).
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should keep it or return it to the purchaser, or how (if retained by the
estate) it should be distributed. Earnouts are not perfect—parties fight
about their implementation—but may be better simply because they
typically involve well-understood post-closing processes that answer
some of these questions. They are a familiar, process-based response to a
distributive problem that would improve predictability and, perhaps,
market participation in Chapter 11 sales.
As with DIP loans, senior creditors’ power to control the timing of
sales should also be limited. Courts should be sensitive to the
participatory and predictive effects that credit bidding may have on
participation in the bidding process. In cases where credit-bidding
appears to deter participation, courts may now conclude that there is
cause to limit or condition the credit bid. Similarly, where the senior
creditor is the purchaser, it should not be permitted to control the
distribution of proceeds, as happened in LifeCare. To do so threatens the
predictability and integrity of the process because it invites collusion and
unequal treatment.
CONCLUSION
Jevic is rightly viewed as the Supreme Court’s most important
opinion on corporate reorganization in many years. Unlike some of the
Court’s opinions on bankruptcy,380 there is little doubt that Jevic got it
right. It is a concise holding, narrowly crafted to address one overt
problem—what is the right priority rule?—but in the process providing
important guidance on the operation of a system that has managed
trillions of dollars in claims and affected hundreds of thousands of jobs
and potentially millions of lives.
It also took an important theoretical position. Behind the priority
debates is a question about the efficiency of different priority rules. As
explained above, these debates have largely failed to account for the
procedural implications of the rule choices, or the power that senior
creditors can gain using their priority. Constraining this power will not
be costless. Indeed, process values generally may add cost to Chapter 11
reorganization. But this may simply mean that welfare maximization is
not the only or most important value in reorganization.381 It is one of
380. See, e.g., Lipson & Vandermeuse, supra note 33, at 1186 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stern v. Marshall).
381. This was a point Justice Kagan seemed to recognize at the Jevic oral argument:
[H]ere’s two different kinds of bankruptcy schemes. One scheme just says every time you
distribute assets, you have to follow the following order: one, two, three, four, five. . . . That’s
one Bankruptcy Code. Here’s another Bankruptcy Code: It says presumptively, you have to

05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY

6/6/2018 9:21 PM

713

several important values. So long as debtors and creditors wish to use
bankruptcy courts to resolve financial distress, the quality of the process
by which they do so will matter, even as it may not be free.
The great bulk of scholarship on corporate reorganization focuses on
distributive questions: which rules will maximize welfare by producing
the greatest return for the largest number of stakeholders? While this is
an appropriate ultimate question, our thinking about it too frequently
ignores the procedural operation and implications of these rules. Jevic
reveals that we should not ignore the quality of the process by which we
reorganize troubled companies. The secret life of priority is process.
POSTSCRIPT
As this Article went to press, the Bankruptcy Court in Jevic granted
the drivers’ motion to convert the Chapter 11 case to a case under
Chapter 7.382 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Court
had sought to have the parties mediate a new settlement, but this
failed.383 Thus, nearly six years after the problematic structured
dismissal was initially approved, and ten years after the debtors went
into bankruptcy, the cases will be resolved by a Chapter 7 trustee.

follow one, two, three, four, five, but if there is a Pareto-superior solution, in other words, a
solution in which some people are made [better] off and nobody . . . gets a worse
outcome . . . if there is such a solution, you can go with that. And that might be a completely
sensible bankruptcy provision . . . . The question is whether Congress did enact it and what
[respondents] can point to in the Bankruptcy Code that suggests that the continual statement
that it’s just one, two, three, four, five is subject to a kind of equitable exception for Paretosuperior outcomes.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct.
973 (2016) (No. 15-649), 2016 WL 7117910, at *43–44.
382. See Oral Ruling, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-01106 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 21,
2018).
383. Id.

